High-end climate change in Europe: impacts, vulnerability and adaptation by Berry, Pam et al.
HIGH-END 
CLIMATE 
CHANGE IN 
EUROPE
 Pam Berry
Richard Betts
Paula Harrison 
Agustín Sanchez-Arcilla
Editors
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation

HIGH-END CLIMATE CHANGE IN EUROPE
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation
Disclaimer: The opinions and arguments expressed herein belong entirely to the authors. Their 
views do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission, the editors or the reviewers.
First published May, 2017 
ISBN 978-954-642-861-5
Pensoft Publishers
12, Prof. Georgi Zlatarski Str.
1111 Sofia, Bulgaria
e-mail: info@pensoft.net
www.pensoft.net 
HIGH-END CLIMATE CHANGE 
IN EUROPE
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation
Berry, P.M., Betts, R.A., Harrison, P.A. and 
Sanchez-Arcilla, A. (Eds.)
This policy booklet, HIgh-End Climate Change in Europe, is based on “work in progress” by research-
ers from the IMPRESSIONS, HELIX and RISES-AM projects. While it has been commented on by expert 
stakeholders and researchers, it has not been subject to a full detailed peer review. The accuracy 
of this work and the conclusions reached are the responsibility of the authors. Decision-makers 
should therefore view the research presented here as a contribution to the wider research base; 
decisions should be informed by this wider research base rather than these early conclusions of 
individual projects.
These projects have received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreements no 603416 
(IMPRESSIONS), 603864 (HELIX) and 603396 (RISES-AM). The Project Co-ordinators would like to thank 
their respective Scientific Project Officers, Estelle Barrillon, Diogo de Gusmão-Sørensen, Marcus 
Gemmer, Eleni Manoli and Denis Peter for all their support and advice.
This work should be cited as: Berry, P.M., Betts, R.A., Harrison, P.A. and Sanchez-Arcilla, A. (Eds.) (2017) 
High-End Climate Change in Europe. Pensoft Publishers, Sofia, 100 pp. 
Dr. Pam Berry, Environmental Change Insti-
tute, University of Oxford, UK
Pam Berry is leader of 
the Biodiversity, Ecosys-
tem Services and Climate 
Adaptation group in the 
Environmental Change 
Institute, University of 
Oxford. She is the Dep-
uty Co-ordinator of the 
EU-funded project IM-
PRESSIONS (Impacts and Responses from High-
end Scenarios: Strategies for Innovative Solu-
tions). Pam’s research includes the integrated 
assessment of climate change impacts on biodi-
versity and ecosystem services and the synergies 
and trade-offs between adaptation and mitiga-
tion actions. She is a Lead Author on the IPBES 
Regional Assessment for Europe and Central Asia, 
sits on DG Environment’s Steering group for the 
Mapping and Assessment of Ecosystem Services 
work and was a Coordinating Lead Author on the 
1st UK National Ecosystem Assessment.
Prof. Richard Betts, University of Exeter 
and Met Office Hadley Centre, UK
Professor Richard Betts 
is Chair in Climate Im-
pacts at the University of 
Exeter and Head of Cli-
mate Impacts Research 
at the Met Office Had-
ley Centre. He is coordi-
nator of the EU-funded 
project HELIX (High-End 
cLimate Impacts and eX-
tremes). Richard’s research focusses on interac-
tions between climate, land ecosystems and the 
hydrological cycle. He was a Lead Author on the 
IPCC Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports, first 
in Working Group 1 (Physical Science Basis), then 
Working Group 2 (Impacts, Adaptation and Vul-
nerability). He was also a lead author on the Mil-
lennium Ecosystem Assessment, and contributed 
to the First and Second UK Climate Change Risk 
Assessments.
Dr. Paula Harrison, Centre for Ecology & 
Hydrology, UK.
Paula Harrison is the 
Principal Natural Cap-
ital Scientist at the 
Centre for Ecology and 
Hydrology in the UK. 
She coordinates the 
EU-funded project IM-
PRESSIONS (Impacts 
and Responses from 
High-end Scenarios: Strategies for Innovative 
Solutions). She specialises in working across 
sectors and disciplines to integrate different 
types of knowledge using both modelling and 
participatory approaches to find innovative 
solutions for adapting to climate change. She 
is a Coordinating Lead Author on the IPBES Re-
gional Assessment for Europe and Central Asia 
and was a Contributing Author on the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report and a Coordinating Lead 
Author on the 2nd UK National Ecosystem As-
sessment.
Prof. Agustín Sanchez Arcilla, Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya, Spain
Prof. Agustín Sanchez 
Arcilla is a full Professor 
at the Catalonia Univ. of 
Technology, Spain. He is 
the co-ordinator of the 
EU-funded RISES-AM 
project. He is the Direc-
tor of the Maritime Engi-
neering Lab (LIM/UPC). 
He has published 16 books and over 130 research 
papers, supervised 28 PhD theses and taken part 
in more than 30 EU research projects.
Editors
Contents
Foreword ....................................................................................................................................................7
Glossary of acronyms  ............................................................................................................................8
Executive summary ............................................................................................................................... 11
Context and Introduction .................................................................................................................... 17
Agriculture ...............................................................................................................................................23
Freshwater ............................................................................................................................................... 31
Coastal protection .................................................................................................................................39
Forestry ....................................................................................................................................................47
Nature conservation  ............................................................................................................................55
Human health .........................................................................................................................................65
Urban ........................................................................................................................................................ 71
Climate impacts in an increasingly globalized world ...................................................................81
Policy insights ........................................................................................................................................87
References  ..............................................................................................................................................95
Contributors  .......................................................................................................................................... 99

9Foreword
The European Union is funding three major in-
ternational research projects - HELIX, IMPRES-
SIONS and RISES-AM - to assess the possible 
impacts of “high-end” climate change and the 
potential for adaptation. Together, these three 
projects address some of the key issues around 
climate change and its management. They bring 
up-to-date and detailed research results from 
climate models and impact analyses together 
with expert knowledge about response options 
in adaptation and mitigation to deliver end-to-
end understanding of the risks from climate 
change and how these can be dealt with. It is 
only through such comprehensive and integrat-
ed studies that effective solutions to climate 
change can be achieved.
From my perspective based in Australia, there 
are some interesting parallels between the 
findings in this Policy Booklet and what is hap-
pening in Australia, and some differences. The 
vast majority of the Australian population, and 
the associated infrastructure, are located along 
the coast, and therefore it is sea-level rise and 
the effects of storm surge and wave storms that 
truly concentrate the minds of policymakers - 
questions around legal liability, who pays, and 
when, where and how to act. Something like 
half the current budget of my organisation, the 
National Climate Change Adaptation Research 
Facility, is devoted to coastal risks. The sections 
on coastal protection in this Policy Booklet res-
onated strongly.
Similarly, the section on health has a focus on 
heat that carries strong messages for anyone 
working in climate change in Australia. Every 
summer brings new extremes and broken re-
cords, and in fact for the summer of 2016/17 it has 
been calculated that 205 records were broken. 
This booklet concludes that there will be ‘limits 
to adaptation to higher temperatures’ and there 
is a message there for Australia, where summer 
temperatures in many places already challenge 
the capacity of humans and animals to adapt. 
But in some respects 
there are important dif-
ferences in where the 
emphasis lies in Eu-
rope and in Australia. 
The potential for vec-
tor-borne diseases to 
spread southwards and for outbreaks to become 
more common is an important risk for Australia 
– for people’s health and well-being, the econo-
my and the natural environment. Bushfire out-
breaks are expected to become more common 
and more intense as temperatures increase and 
the environment dries – and indeed there is evi-
dence that this is already happening. Whether or 
not it’s called autonomous or planned adapta-
tion or simply disaster preparedness, people are 
now more aware of their risk from bushfire, and 
more likely to prepare a proper plan of action. 
Perhaps the greatest difference is the sense in 
Australia that some of the risks are close, in-
deed already with us. Whereas in Europe there 
is a little more time before impacts become 
strongly negative. The two great challenges for 
Australia are, first, to build acceptance of the 
risks and the need to act amongst communities 
that can be sceptical of the reality of climate 
change and, second, to transition from planning 
to adaptation action. It seems that many thou-
sand adaptation strategies have been written, 
but that the positive adaptation actions can be 
counted only in the few hundreds. 
HELIX, IMPRESSIONS and RISES-AM provide com-
prehensive knowledge to underpin effective ac-
tion to address the risks of climate change. There 
is considerable likelihood that, in the absence 
of such knowledge, actions to address climate 
change will be maladaptive – adaptations will 
increase greenhouse gas emissions and actions 
to address short-term risks will create path de-
pendencies in the future. The existence of well 
thought through Policy Booklets such as this will 
help to guard against such an eventuality. 
Jean Palutikof, Professor 
and Director, National Cli-
mate Change Adaptation 
Research Facility, Griffith 
University, Australia
Prof. Jean Palutikof
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Glossary of Acronyms
AEI – Adaptation Effort Indices a measure used 
to highlight management need for species 
conservation
AoC – Areas of Concern a measure used to high-
light where climate becomes unsuitable for 
>75% of the species modelled
CanESM2/CanRCM4 - Canadian Centre for Cli-
mate Modelling and Analysis Earth System 
Model version 2 driving Regional Climate 
Model version 4
CAP - Common Agricultural Policy
CETA - Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement
CNI - Connectivity Necessity Index a measure of 
areas that would benefit the most from hab-
itat connectivity as an adaptation strategy
CoP 21 - UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Conference of the Parties 21st yearly 
session. COP21 was 30 November - 12 Decem-
ber 2015 in Paris and is where the ‘Paris Agree-
ment’ was negotiated and agreed by 174 coun-
tries. The Adaption of the Paris Agreement 
reads “...holding the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above 
preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policies
cVeg DG DEVCO – European Commission Direc-
torate General for International Cooperation 
and Development
DG CLIMA – European Commission Director-
ate-General for Climate Action
DIPECHO - Disaster Preparedness European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
prOtection department
ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy
ERDF – European Regional Development Fund
FAP - EU Forest Action Plan
FS - EU Forest Strategy
GAMM- Global Approach to Migration and Mo-
bility
GCM-RCM – General Circulation Model with an 
embedded Regional Climate Model for high-
er spatial resolution
GDP - Gross Domestic Productivity
GES – Good Environmental Status (by 2020) is 
the main goal of the European Union’s Ma-
rine Strategy Framework Directive
GFDL - Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
GISS - NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies
GISS+EC-Earth-HR - high-resolution version of 
the EC-Earth climate model driven by sea 
surface temperatures from the GISS climate 
model
HadGEM2-ES – Hadley Centre (of the UK’s Met 
Office) Global Environment Model, version 2, 
Earth System configuration 
HadGEM2-ES/RCA4 - Hadley Centre Global En-
vironment Model, version 2, Earth System 
configuration, driving with Rossby Centre Re-
gional Atmosphere Model 4
HECC – High-End Climate Change
HELIX – High-End CLimate Impacts and eX-
tremes research project
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IMPRESSIONS – Impacts and Risks from High-
End Scenarios: Strategies for Innovative 
Solutions research project
IPCC WGII AR5 – Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change Working Group 2 Assessment 
Report 5 
IPSL - Institut Pierre Simon Laplace LULUCF - 
Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
IPSL-CM5A-MR/WRF - IPSL Climate Model ver-
sion 5, medium resolution, driving the 
Weather Research and Forecasting model
IPSL+EC-Earth-HR - High-resolution version of 
the EC-Earth climate model driven by sea 
surface temperatures from the IPSL climate 
model
IPSL+HadGEM3-HR - High-resolution version of 
the 3rd Hadley Centre Global Environment 
Model driven by sea surface temperatures 
from the IPSL climate mode
NBS – Nature-Based Solutions
ND-GAIN - University of Notre-Dame Global Ad-
aptation Index
NWRM - Natural Water Retention Measures
ORCHIDEE - Organizing Carbon and Hydrology in 
Dynamic Ecosystems [land surface model]
PAs – Protected Areas [of land use and habitat 
conservation]
RCM – Regional Climate Model, typically with 
higher spatial resolution than global General 
Circulation Model (GCM)
RCPs - Representative Concentration Pathways 
the four greenhouse gas emission trajecto-
ries used in the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Re-
port. See SSPs also.
rIAM – Regional Integrated Assessment Model 
for examining the interactions at the Region-
al Scale between climate change, the land, 
water and atmosphere responses of the 
Earth System, and human economics
RISES-AM – Responses to coastal climate change: 
Innovative Strategies for high-End Scenarios 
Adaptation and Mitigation research project
RSLR – Relative Sea-Level Rise 
RUG – Regional Urban Growth model
SDGs – UN Sustainable Development Goals
SLR – Sea-Level Rise
SWL - Specific Warming Level
SSP - Shared Socio-economic Pathways the five 
global development storylines combined 
with quantitative social drivers used in the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report. See RCPs 
also.
TCI - Transnational Climate Impacts Index [of 
Stockholm Environment Institute]
TTIP - Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership
UHI – Urban Heat Island air temperature is 
measurably higher in cities than it is in the 
surrounding countryside
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In 2013, the European Commission funded three 
major projects to assess climate change impacts, 
adaptation and vulnerability for “high-end sce-
narios” - defined as global warming exceeding 
2oC relative to pre-industrial. These projects are: 
HELIX (High-End cLimate Impacts and eXtreme); 
IMPRESSIONS (IMPacts and REsponses from high-
end Scenarios: Strategies for Innovative Solu-
tiONS) and RISES-AM (Responses to coastal cli-
mate change: Innovative Strategies for high-End 
Scenarios - Adaptation and Mitigation), which 
between them involve over 150 researchers from 
leading scientific institutions across Europe and 
also in Africa, Asia and America.
Drawing on a very wide range of expertise from 
many disciplines in both the natural and social 
sciences, we are developing new understanding 
of the implications and risks of exceeding 2oC, 
the challenges and opportunities of adaptation 
to such a warmer world, and the extent to which 
risks can be reduced if warming is held as close 
as possible to 1.5oC.
We are examining impacts and adaptation 
relevant to a number of areas addressed by 
policy: food, freshwater, forestry, coastal pro-
tection, nature conservation, urban areas and 
infrastructure, human health and foreign policy. 
We are also considering cross-cutting impacts, 
challenges and opportunities for transforma-
tional change as a response to multiple, inter-
acting risks.
This report presents the findings of these three 
projects as of early 2017.
Agriculture
 ᴑ High-end climate change will potentially 
have strong and lasting effects on the ag-
ricultural sector and consequently on food 
markets and food security across the globe, 
and also in Europe. 
 ᴑ The existence of future food production 
tipping points for the European agriculture 
sector depends on the complex scenar-
io-dependent inter-play between future 
food demand, net food imports, and Euro-
pean agricultural productivity.
 ᴑ European land-use appears more sensitive 
to future socio-economic change than cli-
mate change. The spatial distribution of im-
pacts on arable and livestock systems will 
depend on the relative impacts of future 
change on agricultural and forest profitability 
(locally and regionally) and the availability of 
irrigation water. Increasing water stress may 
lead to increased competition for water in 
many catchments, as a result of reduced wa-
ter availability due to climate change and/or 
increasing water demand (from agriculture, 
public water supply and the environment).
 ᴑ Autonomous adaptation is expected to 
feature northwards and north-westwards 
shifts in agricultural systems as land suit-
ability and productivity change. High-end 
climate change may pose important chal-
lenges and opportunities for the livestock 
sector in Europe. Heat stress is likely to in-
crease in indoor and outdoor livestock and 
poultry, including during transportation.
 ᴑ Many species and habitats will be directly or 
indirectly (positively and negatively) affected 
by high-end scenarios. Many pollinators, crit-
ical for producing good crop yields, may lose 
climate space, especially in southern Europe.
Freshwater
 ᴑ Annual mean runoff is generally project-
ed to increase in northern Europe and 
decrease in southern Europe. In the cen-
tral latitudes of Europe, there is no clear 
agreement between models on either 
Executive summary
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increases or decreases in annual mean 
flows. 
 ᴑ In projections with a high emissions scenar-
io, the population annually affected by riv-
er floods in Europe increases from approxi-
mately 216,000 people per year in 1976-2005 
to between 500,000 and 640,000 per year 
around 2050, and 540,000 to 950,000 per year 
around 2080. The projected damage costs of 
river flooding increases from approximately 
5.3 B€ per year in 1976-2005 to 20 to 40 B€ per 
year around 2050, and 30 to 100 B€ per year 
in 2080. Much of the uncertainty range aris-
es due to socio-economic scenario assump-
tions, especially the economic damages.
 ᴑ Adaptation efforts aimed at trying to avoid 
floods may not be effective in the long 
term. An alternative approach to reduce 
the flood risk could favour measures tar-
geted at reducing the impacts of floods, 
rather than trying to avoid them.
 ᴑ Drought prone areas increase with global 
warming particularly in the Mediterranean 
region. Low flows are projected to become 
less extreme in northern Europe but more 
extreme in Southern Europe. In some cas-
es, low flows may decrease even in areas 
where annual mean flows increase. 
 ᴑ Projected increases in the severity and du-
ration of freshwater shortages, especially 
for the southern part of Europe, have sev-
eral implications for agriculture, forest and 
ecosystems, domestic supply, power sup-
ply and tourism.
 ᴑ Among the most impacted countries, there 
is a high model consensus that substan-
tial areas of Spain are projected to face a 
large increase in the duration of extreme 
prolonged droughts. 
Coastal protection
 ᴑ Even if emissions and temperatures stabi-
lise, sea-levels will continue to rise. Climate 
change mitigation may help to reduce the 
rate of sea-level rise to manageable levels, 
but adaptation is required to help cope 
with the residual rise.
 ᴑ Coastal monitoring (e.g. tide gauges, beach 
surveys) is required to determine the en-
vironmental state, and whether acceptable 
thresholds of risk are being reached. This 
would help determine if and when adap-
tation needs to change in order to achieve 
the management goal.
 ᴑ Intervention for successful adaptation will 
be most effective if it is bespoke, balanc-
ing financial, economical, societal, equi-
table, governance, legislative and envi-
ronment interests. Soft engineering and 
nature-based solutions are increasingly 
encouraged for a sustainable coast, but 
have only been proven in a limited number 
of pilot cases. Further research is required 
into resources and effectiveness of nature 
based solutions (NBS). It is recognised that 
not everywhere can be protected.
 ᴑ Flexibility is required in adaptation, with 
multiple choices to achieve a management 
goal (e.g. defined risk levels). Adaptation 
pathways provide one structured way to 
achieve this. These can be challenging to 
generate due to barriers in planning for 
adaptation.
 ᴑ Governance, societal and cultural accep-
tance of flexible change present the great-
est barrier for adaptation, particularly over 
the longer term (> 50 years). This is partic-
ularly difficult as it is hard to envisage and 
act on long-term change, when short-term 
needs are greater and more immediate than 
the long-term sustainability of the coast.
 ᴑ Priorities will depend on policy criteria, 
ability to pay, societal preference and tech-
nological feasibilities. Areas with high ex-
posure of people and assets (e.g. cities) 
demand more stringent protection and 
adaptation as risk levels are high. Lower 
population densities are less likely to be 
protected at the same level, and other ad-
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aptation options need to be explored. This 
will lead to equity issues, particularly if ad-
aptation is paid from national budgets to 
which all citizens contribute.
Forestry
 ᴑ Some climate-induced changes in Europe-
an forests are expected to occur relatively 
smoothly over time, whereas others may 
occur as “shocks”, passing thresholds or tip-
ping points.
 ᴑ In the climate change scenarios considered 
here, there is a clear north-south gradient 
regarding the impacts of climate change on 
forests, excluding other factors such as CO2 
physiological effects and nitrogen deposi-
tion. High latitudes and elevations poten-
tially benefit from climate change, and for-
ests at low latitudes potentially lose as a 
result of projected shifts towards drier con-
ditions, particularly in the Mediterranean 
region. Different regional climate outcomes 
could result in different impacts. 
 ᴑ Increased CO2 concentrations have a po-
tentially positive effect on forest pro-
ductivity. In the absence of acclimation 
of trees to elevated CO2, this driver could 
modulate the impact of climatic change by 
either further increasing forest productiv-
ity (e.g., at high latitudes or elevations), or 
at least partly compensating for negative 
climatic effects.
 ᴑ Forestry can be adapted to the changing 
climate by switching to climatically better 
adapted species, and moving towards for-
estry systems that include more than one 
tree species at the stand scale.
 ᴑ European forests and forest products are 
significant contributors to the European 
greenhouse gas balance, constituting a ma-
jor carbon sink that can help to reach EU 
climate targets.
 Nature conservation
 ᴑ Under high-end climate change scenarios, 
the combined effects of climatic and so-
cio-economic change pose high risks to bio-
diversity across Europe. There is consider-
able risk of major transformations of many 
ecosystems in southern Europe.
 ᴑ The greatest scope for gains in biodiversi-
ty arises from potential land abandonment, 
mainly in northern Europe. The magnitude 
and uncertainty of climate and land-use 
change in parts of southern Europe, imply 
a need for intervention to avoid the loss of 
key connecting habitats and the worst pos-
sible outcomes for conservation.
 ᴑ Rates of climate change under high emis-
sions scenarios would largely be in excess of 
the ability of species to keep up through dis-
persal, although the extent to which this be-
comes a problem will depend on the length 
of time the climate continues to warm.
 ᴑ Support for nature conservation at local 
and national scales has been demonstrated 
to be an important factor in maintaining the 
scale and connectivity of natural areas.
 ᴑ Land for nature conservation fundamentally 
depends on food demand and the intensi-
ty of agricultural production, with intensive 
production allowing land-sparing for con-
servation, and extensive production limiting 
the scope for nature conservation, except 
through multifunctional land-uses.
 ᴑ Protecting conservation areas to prevent 
intensification in one location may lead to 
knock-on effects on other habitats else-
where, for some scenarios.
 ᴑ Nature-based approaches can support tran-
sition away from non-renewable to renew-
able natural capital and can be associated 
with increased co-production and provision 
of ecosystem services. The widespread use 
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of nature-based solutions provides many 
opportunities for synergies across policy 
objectives, including benefits to both cli-
mate change adaptation and mitigation. As 
such, nature-based solutions can enable 
the transition from a resource-intensive 
towards a more resource-efficient and sus-
tainable development model model.
Human Health
 ᴑ Higher temperatures could have significant 
impacts for health and wellbeing including 
human comfort, particularly in southern 
Europe. 
 ᴑ Under high emissions scenarios, high tem-
peratures after mid-century would be ex-
pected to alter patterns of daily living and 
working. 
 ᴑ Autonomous adaptation could offset signif-
icant impacts but there will be limits to ad-
aptation to higher temperatures. 
 ᴑ Adaptation strategies relating to new build 
and retrofitting of dwellings has implica-
tions for mitigation policy unless energy in-
tensive space cooling is avoided. 
 ᴑ Climate change is projected to increase 
child undernutrition in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca and South Asia, but research is needed 
to understand the full implications of the 
high-end scenarios. 
Urban
 ᴑ Artificial surface extent could vary from 
about 4% of the European land area today, to 
approximately 4% to 9% of that area by 2100, 
depending on the socio-economic scenario.
 ᴑ Population change is a key driver of fu-
ture artificial surface expansion. However, 
changes to the demographic profile of this 
population, their residential preferences 
and planning legislation have the potential 
to restrict or magnify patterns of growth. A 
declining population does not imply a static 
artificial surface extent in the presence of 
changing residential preferences.
 ᴑ The contrasting residential profiles of each 
socio-economic scenario influence the extent 
and location of future artificial surfaces. The 
dense urban networks of Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, western Germany and southern Unit-
ed Kingdom promote concentrations of future 
suburban development. This is in contrast to 
the ‘hotspots’ of development that are more 
sparsely distributed across, for example, 
Spain, Portugal and the Nordic countries.
 ᴑ Sprawling urban development could place 
greater pressure on sensitive ecosystems as 
the population in close proximity to protect-
ed areas, water bodies and coastal regions 
increases.
Foreign policy and 
international development
 ᴑ Transnational climate change impacts could 
have substantial effects on Europe. High-
end scenarios could imply increased sys-
temic effects of climate change, including 
cross-sectoral and transnational climate 
impacts. However, research on the physical 
as well as governance aspects of transna-
tional climate impacts is still in its infancy.
 ᴑ Transnational climate impacts still play a 
minor role in the EU, as well as in Members 
States’ adaptation policies. The potential 
international dimension of climate impacts 
may provide incentives for more collabora-
tion between EU Member States, as well as 
between the EU and other parts of the world.
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Policy Insights
 ᴑ Either avoiding or exceeding 2oC global 
warming could pose unprecedented chal-
lenges as well as new opportunities for 
societal transformation. Innovative ap-
proaches in science and policy may be 
required. Integrated strategies for these 
new social-ecological conditions could be 
achieved, and ensured in the long run, by 
linking climate-oriented, practical, systemic 
solutions to sustainable development. 
 ᴑ Sustainable solutions are those that are 
able to overcome multiple trade-offs be-
tween ecological integrity and socio-eco-
nomic goals in ways which can be turned 
into positive synergies. Clusters of sustain-
able solutions can be identified, tested and 
implemented by integrating multiple forms 
of knowledge and values in concrete places 
following transformative visions of the kind 
of world in which we want to live. 
 ᴑ Conventional and additive approaches fo-
cusing on single sectors, scales or either ad-
aptation or mitigation without considering 
long-term sustainable development may not 
be enough to cope with the mounting risks 
and challenges of high-end climate change. 
Innovative approaches entail combining 
multiple systems of solutions that not only 
solve present problems but also learn how to 
transform current systems arrangements so 
as to prevent them occurring again.
 ᴑ Conventional policy appraisal methods are 
designed for relatively short-term, well-un-
derstood policy choices in single sectors 
and are not feasible for transformative ap-
proaches combining multiple systems of 
solutions. They face severe limitations for 
assessing the impact of very long-term de-
cisions about adaption and mitigation in 
the face of large climate risks.
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Policy background
Although the Paris Agreement commits its sig-
natories to holding global warming to well be-
low 2oC and pursuing efforts to limit warming 
to 1.5oC, the emissions pathways implied by the 
current Nationally Determined Contributions 
would still lead to warming well in excess of 
2oC. This will inevitably lead to further ongoing 
sea-level rise and alter weather patterns around 
the globe. It is thus vital that decision-makers 
have access to reliable scientific information on 
these uncertain, but potentially high-risk, sce-
narios of the future. This information should 
inform the need for transformative strategies 
to address potential synergies and trade-offs 
between adaptation, mitigation and sustain-
able development. Policy-makers, businesses 
and other decision-makers need to understand 
impacts at a range of levels of global warming, 
and also begin to plan ahead for adaptation to 
changes in climate associated with higher levels 
of global warming. This requires coherent infor-
mation on the potential conditions which may 
need to be adapted to, and the consequences 
of different courses of adaptation action. Along-
side this, ongoing international negotiations on 
limiting global warming also require clear infor-
mation on the consequences of different levels 
of climate change. 
Previous state of the art
While numerous studies have explored the im-
pacts of climate change at a variety of spatial 
scales on different policy sectors (e.g. IPCC, 
2014), much of the information is conflicting, 
unclear, of unknown levels of certainty and dif-
ficult to apply to inform decisions. 
The information currently available is often 
inconsistent across scales. Different methods 
are used for addressing different questions, 
and lack of consistency can lead to confusion 
and potentially exposes decision-makers to 
risks of poor decisions, either because incom-
plete information is available or because the 
available information is too varied and incon-
sistent to be useful. 
 
Moreover, most studies ignore potential inter-
actions with other sectors. Cross-sectoral inter-
actions are important since changes in one sec-
tor can affect another sector either directly (e.g. 
land-use change affects regional hydrology) 
or indirectly through policy (e.g. measures de-
signed for coastal flood defence also impact on 
coastal habitat) (Harrison et al., 2015). Ignoring 
cross-sectoral interactions is likely to lead to 
misrepresentation of impacts, and consequent-
ly to poor decisions about climate adaptation 
(Harrison et al., 2016). 
Many previous studies report the impacts of 
climate change under current socio-economic 
conditions, but in fact impacts will interact with 
those associated with continuing socio-eco-
nomic and political changes, in potentially com-
plex, non-additive ways (Holman et al., 2015). 
This highlights the importance of assessing 
multiple interacting pressures (both climatic 
and socio-economic) to understand the vulner-
ability of human and environmental systems. 
Previously, estimates of vulnerability have been 
undertaken at global scales at relatively coarse 
resolutions, whilst analyses at local scales have 
been limited, where there was no information 
on high-resolution projected pressures or asso-
ciated responses. For example, in the case of 
sea-level rise impacts at the global scale, most 
existing approaches only consider retreat or 
defence interventions for a limited number of 
coastal typologies, mainly vulnerable low-lying 
coasts with limited inclusion of existing infra-
structures (or planned ones) and the socio-eco-
nomic activities that the coast supports.. More-
over, the interventions considered are based on 
conventional coastal engineering (additional 
Context and Introduction
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nourishment or higher coastal structures). Nev-
ertheless, there are many local scale examples 
based on coastal restoration (partial re-wilding) 
and managed re-alignment. Such nature-based 
approaches have received limited attention at 
the regional scale and are lacking at the global 
scale, although their potential under future cli-
mates remains large. 
These issues are particularly important under 
high-end climate change as such scenarios may 
lead to amplified interdependencies between 
different sectors as well as between regions, in-
cluding countries beyond the EU’s borders (e.g. 
via food and resource supply chains or large-
scale migration). Furthermore, high-end scenar-
ios may push societies in Europe and elsewhere 
well beyond the limits of adaptation (Simons-
son et al., 2011), but the nature of these limits 
remains highly uncertain (Watkiss et al., 2015), 
creating a significant challenge for both science 
and decision-making. 
Advancing the science and 
its application
The EU-funded projects HELIX, IMPRESSIONS 
and RISES-AM address these issues with new 
scenarios of climate change impacts, adapta-
tion and vulnerability designed to be more inte-
grated and internally-consistent than previous 
research. The research covers a very wide range 
of scales from global to local, making use of 
insights from stakeholders to make the results 
and advice relevant to decision-making. 
The projects assess a wide range of sectors and 
systems, including agriculture, freshwater, coasts, 
urban areas, infrastructure, human health, biodi-
versity and foreign policy. Interactions between 
these are of particular interest. The main focus is 
on scenarios of climate change above 2oC global 
warming, particularly 4oC or even 6oC warming, 
although some assessment of impacts at 1.5oC is 
also being carried out.
Much of the work assessing impacts, adaptation 
and vulnerability in Europe is from the continen-
tal scale down to individual local case studies. 
The projects also assess these issues across the 
globe, including particularly vulnerable regions 
and/or densely populated regions. The role of 
climate change as an additional factor in wid-
er issues, such as security, health and migration, 
are of key interest.
We have worked closely with a range of stake-
holders to identify the technical and political 
problems they face when making decisions 
about complex and uncertain issues, and the 
information, tools and methods they need to 
overcome these barriers. This participatory ap-
proach aims to ensure that the outputs of the 
projects meet the needs of decision-makers, 
helping them to make long-term plans based 
on a full awareness of climate risks, adaptation 
limits and adaptation/mitigation opportunities. 
Locally-relevant information, such as details of 
coastal interventions to manage flooding risk, 
is being sought and implemented by combining 
advanced scientific knowledge with local stake-
holders’ criteria and preferences.
A major issue for climate policy is that it re-
quires decision-making in the face of large 
uncertainties. Although there is confidence in 
the basic principle that ongoing emissions will 
cause further warming at global scales, the lo-
cal implications of this are far from clear. Glob-
al warming of, for example, 2oC, could be asso-
ciated with a wide range of changes in climate 
in Europe and individual countries or cities. 
Adaptation decisions, therefore, need to be re-
silient to many possible future climate states, 
so the projects assessed a number of differ-
ent regional outcomes. Moreover, vulnerability 
and adaptive capacity will depend on societal 
factors which again are complex and hard to 
project, so a number of different scenarios are 
assessed. The timing of reaching a particular 
climate state is of key importance – for exam-
ple, even if 2oC is reached eventually, if it is 
reached slowly then there may be more scope 
for adaptation than if it is reached quickly. 
This is critical for natural systems which are 
unlikely to be able to track rapid changes in 
climate (see Nature Conservation), but also for 
social systems in which decision-making and 
governance arrangements may need to trans-
form. To address such issues, we are improv-
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ing how adaptation is modelled by incorpo-
rating a more comprehensive representation 
of associated constraints, triggers, time lags 
and consequences, and developing new mod-
els which simulate adaptation as a process by 
representing the behaviour of decision-mak-
ers, firms and institutions as agents who learn 
and interact over different timescales.
It is also important not to assume that mod-
els give us a complete picture of future climate 
risks or societal states. With such complex sys-
tems, major changes may occur that are not 
captured by current model projections, physical 
or economic understanding or experience. We 
are investigating the potential impacts of pass-
ing tipping points in the climate system, such 
as a collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Over-
turning Circulation, and socio-economic shocks, 
such as collapse of financial markets or rapid 
shifts in human consumption.
Pathways are being analysed to assess the need 
for transformative strategies that take account 
of potential synergies and trade-offs between 
adaptation, mitigation and sustainable devel-
opment. We are also evaluating how the new 
knowledge gained from the scenarios, impact 
modelling and pathways can be embedded 
within decision-making processes, so that ef-
fective climate governance plans can be con-
ceived that deal with adaptation and mitigation 
in a synergistic way.
High-end scenarios
We assessed the impacts of climate change in 
a number of high-end scenarios. HELIX framed 
these in terms of Specific Warming Levels (SWL) 
– particular levels of global warming, such as 
2oC, 4oC and 6oC. Such a framing is often viewed 
as more accessible to decision-makers than 
the time-dependent scenarios that are often 
used, and indeed the Paris Agreement frames 
the policy objectives in terms of such warming 
levels, i.e. 2oC and 1.5oC. We used a large num-
ber of models of global and regional climate 
in order to capture a wide range of possible 
outcomes (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Patterns of projected climate change at 4°C 
global warming, across the world and over Europe, il-
lustrating uncertainties. (a) Annual mean temperature 
change averaged across all models from the 5th Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5). (b, c) Annual 
mean precipitation change in Europe simulated by two 
example climate models, illustrating different simulat-
ed precipitation changes. (d) Changes in European mean 
temperature and precipitation for 54 individual climate 
simulations. All results are means over 30-year periods 
centred around the time of global warming passing 4°C 
relative to pre-industrial.
Nevertheless, since the timing of reaching 
such warming levels is crucial for some of the 
impacts and also for assessing vulnerability 
and adaptation, time-dependent scenarios are 
still necessary. In HELIX, the range of times of 
reaching SWLs was determined using the Rep-
resentative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), 
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which are scenarios of changes in atmospheric 
composition that could result from various fu-
ture emissions and various different strengths 
of feedback in the climate system. IMPRESSIONS 
and RISES-AM also used climate projections 
based on the RCPs. Any given future emissions 
scenario may lead to a wide range of future 
changes in CO2 in the atmosphere, depending 
on the extent to which natural carbon sinks 
become strengthened or weakened by climate 
change itself. Conversely, any particular future 
trajectory of concentrations may result from a 
range of different emissions scenarios, again de-
pending on the strength and sign of feedbacks. 
The possibility of non-linear changes and the 
passing of ‘tipping points’ in ecosystems adds 
further uncertainty. Changes in the concentra-
tions of other greenhouse gases may also de-
pend on feedbacks with climate change, com-
plicating the relationship with emissions. Since 
the climate models used in our projects were 
driven by concentrations rather than emissions, 
the resulting climate states are compatible with 
a range of different emissions scenarios. Most 
of our analyses examined the scenario with the 
greatest increase in greenhouse gas concen-
trations known as RCP8.5 (Figure 2), denoting a 
radiative forcing (change in the Earth’s energy 
balance) of 8.5 Watts per Square Metre, Wm-2 – 
an Earth System Model analysis shows that this 
would be associated with global CO2-eq emis-
sions approaching stabilisation at between 20 
and 30 GtC of carbon by 2100 (two to three times 
the current emissions of about 10GtC). (Jones et 
al, 2013). We also looked at scenario RCP4.5 (a 
radiative forcing of 4.5 Wm-2). Although this is 
still an increase in concentrations, holding the 
concentrations to these levels would neverthe-
less require emissions to decrease to between 2 
to 8 GtC by 2100 – CO2 is only gradually removed 
from the atmosphere, so it continues to build 
up even if emissions reduce, until emissions 
become zero. 
For future changes in society including eco-
nomic conditions, the Shared Socio-economic 
Pathways (SSPs) provide a means for exploring 
uncertainties about how social and econom-
ic conditions might develop in the future and 
for considering how those changes might al-
ter society’s vulnerability to climate change 
and ability to adapt (O’Neill et al., 2015). They 
describe a set of alternative plausible trajec-
tories of future societal development which 
pose challenges to adaptation and mitigation 
(Figure 3). The SSPs consist of five narrative 
storylines, a set of descriptive trends in demo-
graphics, human development, economy and 
lifestyle, policies and institutions, technology, 
and environment and natural resources, along 
with a set of quantifications for some key vari-
ables (e.g. population growth, GDP and urban-
isation). 
Figure 3. Graphical presentation of the Shared Socioeco-
nomic Scenarios (SSPs). Adapted from O’Neill et al. (2015).
Figure 2. Changes in global mean temperature relative to 
1985-2005 projected for the CMIP5 climate models, illus-
trating the range of uncertainty in rates of warming. The 
two plumes show the highest and lowest emissions sce-
narios, RCP8.5 (red) and RCP2.6 (dark blue). The bars on 
the right show the warming at the end of the century in 
these two scenarios and also two intermediate scenar-
ios. The numbers next to the plumes show the number 
of climate models used for each projection or the his-
torical period. Note that the temperature change shown 
here is relative to 1985-2010 – for changes relative to 
pre-industrial, 0.6°C should be added. Reproduced from 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5th Assess-
ment Report, Working Group 1 Summary for Policymakers. 
Copyright IPCC (2012). 
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The global SSPs have been downscaled and ex-
tended for Europe by IMPRESSIONS (Kok and 
Pedde, 2016). These were further downscaled to 
regions within Europe by RISES-AM and IMPRES-
SIONS to provide improved regional specificity 
and greater temporal and sectoral detail. Only 
four of the five SSPs were downscaled (SSP2, 
the middle of the road scenario, was exclud-
ed as this is the least extreme (‘high-end’) of 
the scenarios with intermediate challenges for 
adaptation and mitigation). An overview of the 
European SSPs is given below (for completeness 
the global overview for SSP2 is included):
 ᴑ SSP1 (Sustainability): There is a high com-
mitment to achieve the sustainable devel-
opment goals through effective governments 
and global cooperation, ultimately resulting 
in less inequality and less resource-intensive 
lifestyles. The European Union expands and 
is characterised by a high level of sustain-
ability-oriented political and societal aware-
ness, focusing on renewable energy and low 
material growth in a strongly regulated but 
effective multi-level governance structure.
 ᴑ SSP2 (Middle of the Road, based on glob-
al narrative): The world follows a path in 
which social, economic, and technological 
trends do not shift markedly from historical 
patterns. Development and income growth 
proceeds unevenly across countries with 
globally connected markets functioning im-
perfectly. Global and national institutions 
work toward, but make slow progress in, 
achieving sustainable development goals.
 ᴑ SSP3 (Regional Rivalry): Sparked by econom-
ic woes in major economies and regional 
conflict, antagonism between and within re-
gional blocs increases, resulting in the dis-
integration of social fabric and many coun-
tries struggling to maintain living standards. 
Eventually the EU breaks down, and a high-
ly carbon-intensive Europe emerges with 
strong regional rivalry and high inequalities.
 ᴑ SSP4 (Inequality): Globally, power becomes 
more concentrated in a relatively small po-
litical and business elite. The EU increases 
commitment to find innovative solutions 
to the depletion of natural resources and 
climate change which initiates a shift to-
wards a high-tech green Europe. However, 
there are increasing disparities in economic 
opportunity, leading to substantial propor-
tions of populations having a low level of 
development. By 2100, Europe is an import-
ant player in a world full of tensions. 
 ᴑ SSP5 (Fossil-fuelled Development): People in 
this world increasingly rely on competitive 
markets, innovation and participatory soci-
eties to produce rapid technological prog-
ress and development of human capital as 
the path to sustainable development. Europe 
plays a leading role in the global economy, but 
this is coupled with the exploitation of abun-
dant fossil fuel resources, including large-
scale extraction of shale gas. Society places 
faith in geo-engineering solutions to counter 
environmental problems that emerge due to 
the over-exploitation of natural resources.
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Key messages
 ᴑ High-end climate change will potentially 
have strong and lasting effects on the ag-
ricultural sector and consequently on food 
markets and food security across the globe, 
and also in Europe. 
 ᴑ The existence of future food production 
tipping points for the European agricul-
ture sector depends on the complex sce-
nario-dependent inter-play between future 
food demand, net food imports, and Euro-
pean agricultural productivity.
 ᴑ European land-use appears more sensitive 
to future socio-economic change than cli-
mate change. The spatial distribution of im-
pacts on arable and livestock systems will 
depend on the relative impacts of future 
change on agricultural and forest profitabil-
ity (locally and regionally) and the avail-
ability of irrigation water. Increasing water 
stress may lead to increased competition 
for water in many catchments, as a result 
of reduced water availability due to climate 
change and/or increasing water demand 
(from agriculture, public water supply and 
the environment).
 ᴑ Autonomous adaptation is expected to fea-
ture northwards and north-westwards shifts 
in agricultural systems as land suitability 
and productivity change. High-end climate 
change may pose important challenges and 
opportunities for the livestock sector in Eu-
rope. Heat stress is likely to increase in in-
door and outdoor livestock and poultry, in-
cluding during transportation.
 ᴑ Many species and habitats will be directly or 
indirectly (positively and negatively) affected 
by high-end scenarios. Many pollinators, crit-
ical for producing good crop yields, may lose 
climate space, especially in southern Europe.
Policy Context
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has three 
key objectives: (1) Viable food production to en-
sure a stable supply of affordable and quality 
food to the EU’s 500 million citizens; (2) Sustain-
able management of natural resources (biodi-
versity, the landscape and soil quality); and (3) 
balanced territorial development. The CAP re-
mains of key importance, contributing to more 
sustainable and inclusive growth, as one of the 
key objectives of the EU’s 2020 Strategy. 
Policy Insights 
Can Europe meet its net food demands 
under high-end scenarios? 
1. How might high-end impacts worldwide af-
fect the EU fOod market (or other assets) and 
food security?
High-end climate change will potentially have 
strong and lasting effects on the agricultural 
sector and consequently on food markets and 
food security across the globe, and also in Eu-
rope. There are large differences between future 
Agriculture
Lead author: Ian Holman
Contributing authors: Pam Berry, Richard Betts, Calum Brown, Tiago Capela Lourenço, 
Henrik Carlsen, Philippe Ciais, Rob Dunford, Adis Dzebo, Sascha Holzhauer, Carles Ibáñez, 
Kasper Kok, Daniel Sandars and Xuhui Wang
26
outlooks in terms of both magnitude of climate 
change and type of socio-economic change, as 
well as between geographical regions. Regarding 
crop productivity, modelling of projected yields 
of wheat, maize and soy suggests that at global 
average temperature increases of 4°C (relative to 
pre-industrial temperatures) and the associated 
CO2 increases and precipitation changes, EU-av-
erage yields could increase, although with some 
wide areas experiencing decreased yields (Figure 
4). It should be noted, however, that such mod-
els do not consider the impacts of CO2 fertilisa-
tion on the nutritional value of these crops nor 
changing patterns of cropping and the potential 
impacts of crop pests and pathogens – these 
could substantially impact yields, but current 
knowledge is not sufficiently advanced to enable 
their effects to be quantified.
IMPRESSIONS scenarios of socio-economic 
change represent large differences in Europe’s 
relationships with the world and the conse-
quent trade relationships that will affect Euro-
pean food markets and food security. The effect 
of socio-economic change is large on trade with 
more agricultural export and import in global-
ising worlds (SSP1 and 5), and less trade in re-
gionalising worlds (SSP3 and 4). 
2. Are there particular tipping points beyond 
which food production in Europe becomes 
compromised?
The existence of food production tipping points 
for the European agriculture sector depends on 
the complex scenario-dependent inter-play be-
tween future food demand, net food imports, 
and European agricultural productivity. Key fac-
tors determining this balance, which are cap-
tured within IMPRESSIONS, are:
 ᴑ population, wealth and dietary preferences 
(influencing European food demand);
 ᴑ agricultural policy (influencing food secu-
rity, agricultural intensity and agricultural 
employment);
Figure 4. Projected percentage of years for which crop yield is below historical average at 4°C global warming, from HELIX. 
(a) Irrigated wheat; (b) irrigated maize; (c) irrigated soybean; (d) rainfed wheat; (e) rainfed maize; (f) rainfed soybean. Colours 
show the average from 5 simulations with one crop model driven by 5 regional climate models. Grey shows where less than 4 
of the 5 projections disagree on the sign of the change.
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 ᴑ innovation (influencing agricultural produc-
tivity);
 ᴑ climate change (influencing productivity, ir-
rigation availability and profitability).
The European agricultural sector will respond 
to these future changes by changing agricultur-
al management practices (e.g. different crops 
or management intensities) and/or land-use 
(through e.g. agricultural conversion, expan-
sion or abandonment) to meet required levels 
of production and food security. IMPRESSIONS 
modelling suggests that Europe will be able to 
meet its net food demand in most scenarios, ex-
cept the SSP1 / We Are The World future, where 
reduced agricultural productivity and increasing 
population and affluence lead to an excessive 
need for expansion of the European agricultural 
area to meet food demand.
3. How might land-use change to meet this?
European land-use appears more sensitive to 
future socio-economic change than climate 
change. The significance of the socio-economic 
factors, acting through food demand, food im-
ports and agricultural productivity, are evident 
within the modelling, when comparing the Eu-
ropean outcomes from high-end climate-only 
scenarios with scenario outcomes from com-
bined climate and socio-economic change sce-
narios (Figure 5). 
The spatial distribution of impacts on arable 
and livestock systems will depend on the rel-
ative impacts of future change on agricultural 
and forest profitability (locally and regionally) 
and the availability of irrigation water. Agricul-
ture is most likely to expand northwards and 
westwards as climatic conditions increase ag-
ricultural land suitability, leading to relative 
improved profitability. Agricultural expansion 
in the Mediterranean region will be limited by 
the generally lower levels of productivity and 
water resources. Policy support will be increas-
ingly important to maintain rural agricultural 
employment in southern Europe as increasing 
water scarcity and decreasing land suitability 
impact production and profitability.
Autonomous adaptation is likely to see north-
wards and north-westwards shifts in agricultur-
al systems as land suitability and productivity 
change. IMPRESSIONS models suggest that trad-
ing patterns and the willingness of land manag-
ers to adopt novel land-uses play a central role in 
allowing efficient adaptation to changing climat-
ic or socio-economic conditions. Therefore, these 
non-climatic factors will substantially determine 
both food supply levels and the scope for main-
taining other necessary or desired land-uses in 
Europe under high-end climate change. 
4. How might European livestock farming be af-
fected under high-end scenarios?
High-end climate will pose important challeng-
es and opportunities for the livestock sector in 
Europe. It will influence animal health and wel-
fare issues through to the availability and qual-
ity of grassland and fodder crops and ultimate-
ly to costs and profitability. High-end scenarios 
are likely to lead to a reduction in cold-related 
stresses on production, a longer growing sea-
son, particularly in northern marginal areas and 
an increase in fodder maize production (due 
to its higher tolerance of drier conditions than 
grass). There are likely to be movements in the 
livestock industry as some production migrates 
to where livestock and poultry feeds are plen-
tiful to minimise costs. Modelling suggests that 
grassland systems will remain throughout most 
of Europe, but with movement towards the more 
temperate north / north-west regions of Europe 
(Figure 5). 
Heat stress is likely to increase in indoor and 
outdoor livestock and poultry (and during 
transportation). This will lead to reduced milk 
yields, egg production and weight gain unless 
adaptations are introduced, such as forced ven-
tilation, installation of cooling pads, increased 
shading. 
What are the main cross-sectoral impacts 
or conflicts? 
In an uncertain future, threats to European food 
security may lead to regional agricultural inten-
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sification and/or expansion as food production 
is prioritised over other land-uses (forestry, 
biodiversity). 
1. Impacts on water resources 
Increasing water stress in many catchments aris-
ing from reduced water availability due to cli-
mate change and/or increasing water demand 
(from agriculture, public water supply and the 
environment) will lead to increased competi-
tion for water. Moves to water prices that reflect 
cost recovery may lead to increased specialisa-
tion within the irrigated agricultural sector and 
reduced usage of low value crops. Increased 
extreme precipitation events and wetter win-
ters are likely to increase soil erosion and the 
transport of associated pollutants (pesticides, 
phosphates) to water courses. The RISES-AM 
case study of the Ebro Del-
ta rice fields has shown that 
the main impact of sea-lev-
el rise will be salt intrusion 
through the subsoil, rather 
than direct flooding, due to 
the existence of coastal de-
fences or future construc-
tion to adapt to this situa-
tion. High-end scenarios will 
cause increased soil salinity 
in most of the delta surface 
which will trigger a decrease 
in rice production (Genua et 
al. 2016). These findings are 
relevant for other low-lying 
rice production areas, such 
as the Rhone Delta (France) 
and Po Delta (Italy).
2. Impacts on biodiversity
Many species and habitats 
will be directly or indirectly 
(positively and negatively) 
affected by high-end sce-
narios. Modelling Shows 
that arable field margin and 
forest species (Figure 6) can 
expect significant changes 
in suitable habitat provision 
under high-end climate sce-
narios. For arable species much of southern Eu-
rope will decrease in suitability, whilst some ar-
eas of northern Europe (e.g. southern Sweden) 
may become more suitable. Similar patterns are 
shown for forest species, where southern Swe-
den and Finland become more suitable, whilst 
mainland Europe, particularly in the south, Po-
land and the UK become considerably less suit-
able. Scenarios leading to regional agricultural 
expansion or intensification may impact natural 
grasslands, heaths, moors and lowland wet-
lands. Agent-based modelling in IMPRESSIONS 
suggests that intensification may result from 
socio-economic conditions of the kind repre-
sented by SSP1, with a consequent risk of en-
vironmental degradation. Conversely, the more 
challenging socio-economic conditions of SSP3 
are likely to lead to widespread abandonment 
of agricultural land in the absence of significant 
Figure 5. Simulated European land-use under a range of high-end scenarios 
using the IMPRESSIONS integrated assessment platform for multiple GCM-RCM 
combinations.
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production subsidies, with serious implications 
for farmland species, but potential benefits for 
biodiversity in unmanaged areas.
Integrated modelling studies in IMPRESSIONS 
show that agricultural adaptation can play a sig-
nificant role in modifying the impacts, through 
modifying land-use change and increasing hab-
itat connectivity to provide greater opportuni-
ties for species to adapt naturally.
3. How resilient are pollinating agents to high-
end climate change in Europe?
Some pollinators, critical for producing good 
crop yields, may lose climate space especial-
ly in southern Europe. 
Modelling suggests that 
eight of the 10 modelled 
key crop pollinator spe-
cies are projected to lose 
suitable climate space 
in the Mediterranean re-
gion and, in some cases, 
along the western coast 
of France, southern Brit-
ain and Ireland and Cen-
tral Europe (Figure 7). This 
modelling does not take 
into account CO2 effects 
on the species, or chang-
es in lifecycle timings, dis-
persal or host plants. The 
pollination service they 
provide could be at risk 
unless other (not mod-
elled) species are more 
resilient or new pollinator 
species become available. 
Conversely, projected ex-
panded areas of cropping 
in southern Scandinavia 
are unlikely to be limit-
ed by the availability of 
pollinators providing that 
the pollinator species are 
able to adapt by moving 
with the climate. 
4. What are the potential conflicts between 
food production and land-use for climate miti-
gation to avoid high-end climate change?
Conflicts can occur between food production and 
land-use for climate mitigation. IMPRESSIONS 
socio-economic scenarios include increased bio-
energy production from intensively farmed land 
and this is at the expense of food production. If 
bioenergy demands were to be met from other 
sources, such as forests, then similar conflicts 
could occur, but in this case with timber pro-
duction and/or carbon sequestration. However, 
in IMPRESSIONS, most socio-economic futures 
lead to land-use change being associated with 
increased climate mitigation (Figure 4). Reduc-
a) Arable field margin species with 
appropriate 
climate and habitat
b) Forest species with appropriate
climate and habitat
Current climate and socio-economics (above)
2050s high-end climate with baseline socio-economics (above).
 Using RCP8.5 and HadGEM 2ES.
Figure 6. Shifting patterns in combined habitat and climate suitability for selected 
arable and forest species, from IMPRESSIONS. There are 18 arable species and 24 
forest species. Grey – suitable for <5 species; green suitable for 5-15 species; dark 
green suitable for >15 species
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tions in the agricultural area allow the 
natural establishment of woodland 
in these areas and a consequent in-
crease in carbon sequestration in bio-
mass and soils. Only SSP1 within IM-
PRESSIONS agent-based modelling of 
land-use change produces a marked 
decrease in overall forest extent as 
land is converted to agricultural use 
to meet demands.
Change as a result of climatic change from current climate to RCP8.5 
(above), from IMPRESSIONS.
Red, decrease in species numbers; Blue increase in species numbers. Grey no change. Co-
lour shades increment at 1 species (light); 1-5 species (mid) and >5 species (dark).
a) Buff-tailed bumblebee (Bombus terrestris) b) Mining bee (Andrena caratonica)
Figure 7. Changes in suitable climate space for two pollinators from 
IMPRESSIONS. Blue = potential new suitable climate space; red = lost 
suitable climate space; green = overlap between current and future 
suitable climate space.
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Key messages
Annual mean runoff is generally projected to 
increase in northern Europe and decrease in 
southern Europe. In the central latitudes of 
Europe, there is no clear agreement between 
models on either increases or decreases in an-
nual mean flows. 
 ᴑ In projections with a high emissions sce-
nario, the population annually affected by 
river floods in Europe increases from ap-
proximately 216,000 people per year in 1976-
2005 to between 500,000 and 640,000 per 
year around 2050, and 540,000 to 950,000 
per year around 2080. The projected dam-
age costs of river flooding increases from 
approximately 5.3 B€ per year in 1976-2005 
to 20 to 40 B€ per year around 2050, and 
30 to 100 B€ per year in 2080. Much of the 
uncertainty range arises due to socio-eco-
nomic scenario assumptions, especially the 
economic damages.
 ᴑ Adaptation efforts aimed at trying to avoid 
floods may not be effective in the long term. 
An alternative approach to reduce the flood 
risk could favour measures targeted at re-
ducing the impacts of floods, rather than 
trying to avoid them.
 ᴑ Drought-prone areas increase with global 
warming particularly in the Mediterranean 
region. Low flows are projected to become 
less extreme in northern Europe but more 
extreme in Southern Europe. In some cases, 
low flows may decrease even in areas where 
annual mean flows increase. 
 ᴑ Projected increases in the severity and du-
ration of freshwater shortages, especially 
for the southern part of Europe, have sev-
eral implications for agriculture, forest and 
ecosystems, domestic supply, power supply 
and tourism.
 ᴑ Among the most impacted countries, there 
is a high model consensus that substantial 
areas of Spain are projected to face a large 
increase in the duration of extreme pro-
longed droughts. 
Policy insights
Climate is a key driver of freshwater resources 
and of changes in hydrological extremes. Re-
cent studies suggest that with increasing global 
warming the contrasting difference of climate 
change effects becomes more pronounced 
between northern and southern European re-
gions. Changes in weather patterns and in the 
space-time distribution of water availability are 
likely to have direct and profound impacts on 
all water-related sectors, including food and 
agriculture, energy supply and demand, health, 
transportation and tourism, among others. Al-
though socio-economic developments are like-
ly to dominate the dynamics of water scarcity, 
decreasing water availability could exacerbate 
water stress and intensify problems of water 
scarcity and irrigation shortfall, particularly in 
the southern and south-eastern European re-
gions, and furthermore affect cross-sectoral im-
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pacts on the water sector. Given the expected 
large impacts of high-end scenarios on dimin-
ishing river flows in the South of Europe, the 
importance to allocate environmental flows us-
ing sound technical methods is crucial to keep 
rivers and other aquatic ecosystems in good 
ecological status. Resource efficiency is very im-
portant in the context of the EU’s policy recom-
mendations of the “Blueprint to safeguard Eu-
rope’s water”. However, it should be noted that 
water savings due to higher efficiency in the 
absence of adequate water allocation mech-
anisms do not necessarily lead to decreasing 
water use. Another way to save freshwater is 
to reuse treated wastewater. Water reuse is an 
accepted practice in several EU Member States, 
and the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive 
pushed Member States to reuse treated waste-
water “whenever appropriate”, but without set-
ting any guidelines and legal definition of the 
term “appropriateness”. Latest results based on 
CLIMSAVE/IMPRESSIONS research showed the 
people-based adaptation archetype as the most 
robust solution to adapt to climate change.
This chapter provides an overview of poten-
tial impacts of high-end climate scenarios on 
freshwater at the European scale through five 
key questions. It also includes preliminary im-
plications of 1.5°C warming “following” the rec-
ommendations of the Paris agreement signed 
at the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21).
What are the impacts of high-end scenarios 
compared to the “well below 2°C” Paris agree-
ment?
Projections of the mean state runoff production 
under +4oC global warming for Europe, show in-
creasing trends for north-eastern Europe and de-
creasing trends for south-western Europe, while 
there are small areas of insignificant changes 
(-5% to 5%) in central Europe (Figure 8). Increas-
es in runoff are more pronounced in the Scan-
dinavian Peninsula (mostly between +25% and 
+75%). For the rest of the north European region 
projected increases in runoff are mostly between 
+5% and +25%. Decreases in mean runoff (-5% to 
-50%) are projected for the Mediterranean and 
for Eastern Europe. There is strong confidence 
(100% model agreement) for the wetter changes 
in the north-east regions. However for the pro-
jected reductions in mean runoff, model agree-
ment varies between 0% (all models agree to-
wards a drier change) and 40% (i.e., 60% of the 
models show decreased runoff and 40% show a 
wetter response). For the lower levels of warm-
ing, there is higher uncertainty on the projected 
negative changes compared to +4oC of warming.
Considering lower levels of warming, the rel-
ative changes in projected runoff are milder 
compared to the +4oC high-end scenario. At 
+1.5oC, an increase of +5% to +25% in mean run-
off is projected for most of the European conti-
nent. Negative changes of -5% to -25% are only 
encountered for small regions scattered in the 
south and north Iberian Peninsula, south Bal-
kans and eastern Europe. 
 
Besides looking at the changes in mean runoff, 
useful information on the future water resourc-
es’ availability can be derived by examining low 
state runoff, here expressed as the 10th lower 
runoff percentile. Low state runoff can serve as 
an indicator of reduced freshwater availabil-
ity and drought conditions’ formation. Under 
+4oC global warming, projections of low runoff 
show increasing trends in north-eastern Europe 
(+5% to +150%) and decreasing trends for the 
south-western part (-5% to below -80%) (Fig-
ure 9). The model agreement for this response 
is stronger compared to mean state runoff. For 
the +2oC and +1.5oC levels of warming, lower but 
both positive and negative changes are project-
ed, with similar patterns. 
How might future floods of European rivers im-
pact the society?
Under high-end climate change, projections of 
the 1 in 100 year flood show large uncertain-
ty in most of central Europe, with several spots 
of significant increase in the flood magnitude. 
Significant negative changes are mainly located 
in southern Spain and in north-eastern Europe. 
Recent research in HELIX revealed further in-
sight on the frequency of future extreme peak 
flows in Europe. While large uncertainty affects 
current estimates of the magnitude of extreme 
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Figure 8. Changes in mean annual runoff production at different warming levels (top row) and the corresponding degree 
of agreement towards a wetter change (bottom row) for a set of high-resolution climate projections, from HELIX. 
Figure 9. Relative changes in low runoff at different warming levels (top row) and the corresponding degree of agreement 
towards a wetter change (bottom row) for a set of high-resolution climate projections, from HELIX.
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floods, their expected frequency is projected to 
rise significantly in most of the European coun-
tries. Projected figures show significant increase 
in the frequency of extreme events larger than 
100% in 21 out of 37 European countries the 
near future (i.e., reference period 2006-2035), 
and a further increase subsequently.
The future flood risk in Europe can be assessed 
by combining the future flood hazard with spa-
tial information on the exposure and vulnerabil-
ity of population and assets. The socio-econom-
ic impact of river floods in Europe is projected 
to increase by an average of 220% by the end 
of the century, due to climate change only. By 
coupling such high-end climate scenarios with 
coherent projections of socio-economic change 
one obtains an overall evaluation of the future 
flood risk and the related uncertainty. Central 
estimates of population annually affected in 
Europe in 2050 are within 500,000 and 640,000 
and within 540,000 and 950,000 in 2080. Larg-
er variability is foreseen in the future economic 
growth and consequently in the expected dam-
age of river flooding, with central estimates at 
20 to 40 B€ in 2050 and 30 to 100 B€ per year in 
2080 (Figure 10).
 
How can Europe adapt to floods and droughts 
under high-end climate scenarios?
Under the projected increase in the impacts of 
future floods and droughts in large parts of Eu-
rope, effective adaptation strategies need to be 
implemented to limit their impact on popula-
tion and assets. The IMPRESSIONS regional In-
tegrated Assessment Model (rIAM) at the Euro-
pean scale has been developed to test whether 
different adaptation and mitigation options 
reduce impacts of climate and socio-econom-
ic changes related to floods and water scarcity 
(but also including biodiversity, land-use di-
versity, land-use intensity and food provision) 
under high-end climate scenarios. Using this 
platform helps to identify a set of robust adap-
tation and mitigation pathways across high-end 
scenarios taking into consideration cross-sec-
toral linkages and interactions. For example, in-
tegrated water resources management can help 
to improve total water supply, however, climate 
change adaptation in regions affected by water 
shortages entails the need for demand man-
agement in one or more sectors and/or mea-
sures to increase water supply.
The last two decades have seen a progressive 
policy shift towards porgrammes to give “room 
for rivers”, aimed to increase the storage space 
of rivers by restoring floodplains and thus re-
ducing the flood depth by spreading floodwaters 
over wider areas. Recent research investigated 
the benefits of flood adaptation measures under 
high-end climate scenarios in Europe. Measures 
include the raising of flood defences, reduction 
of the peak flows through water retention, reduc-
tion of vulnerability and relocation to safer areas. 
It suggests that the future increase in expected 
damage and population affected by river floods 
can be compensated through different configu-
rations of adaptation measures. The adaptation 
efforts should favour measures targeted at re-
ducing the impacts of floods, rather than trying 
to avoid them; innovative and cost-effective eco-
system-based disaster risk approaches, such as 
Figure 10. Historical and projected population affected 
(upper) and damage (lower) per year in Europe and rel-
ative change from the baseline scenario (second y-axis). 
Future scenarios include No SSP (only climate forcing), 
SSP3 and SSP5 as well as their 10-year moving average, 
from HELIX.
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natural water retention measures (NWRM could 
be considered as well, including their mitigation 
potential. In particular, relocation (Figure 11) and 
vulnerability reduction measures should be fur-
ther developed, thanks to their two key features 
of, firstly, reducing the impacts of all floods with-
out reducing their frequency, thus strengthen-
ing the resilience of societies and ultimately the 
“adaptation effect”. Secondly, their risk reduction 
potential is minimally affected by the uncertain-
ty of climatic projections, as opposed to those 
measures targeted аt reducing the occurrence of 
future flood events. 
On the other hand the projected increase in se-
verity and duration of freshwater shortages, espe-
cially for the southern part of Europe, has several 
implications for various sectors, including agri-
culture, forest and ecosystems, domestic supply, 
power supply and tourism. Regarding agriculture, 
hydrological drought can be a major stressor for 
this sector. For example, more frequent and pro-
longed droughts in combination with heat stress 
is estimated to be the major limiting factor in crop 
yields, causing increased crop stress and failure in 
parts of central and southern Europe, especially 
in the Mediterranean. Reduced summer river flow 
in combination with higher water temperatures is 
projected to affect the European power generat-
ing capacity. The overall decline in summer river 
flows is expected to increase the vulnerability of 
the power supply, calling for an urgent imple-
mentation of adaptation strategies. Hydropower 
is expected to “follow” projected runoff patterns 
with an overall increase for northern Europe and 
strong decline in the southern Europe. 
Proposed adaptation actions include rain-water 
storage expansion, desalination, increased wa-
ter use efficiency by water recycling and waste-
water re-use, introduction of drought resistant 
crops and changes to the cropping calendar (for 
example use early ripening cultivars to escape 
heat or drought stress) and agriculture-based 
change to NWRM. Adaptation strategies for the 
energy sector should include a larger contribu-
tion of renewable energy resources, replace-
ment of recirculation (tower) cooling systems 
and replacement of coal-, lignite- and oil-fu-
elled power plants by gas-fired power plants. 
How might mean and low flows change at the 
river basin scale?
Looking at the basin scale (Figure 12), mean and 
low flows are expected to change due to the 
effect of global warming. The average changes 
indicate an increase of mean runoff in the Ke-
Figure 11. Average risk reduction in case of relocation of population and assets within high flood-risk areas, from HELIX.
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mijoki and Elbe basins, decreased mean run-
off in Guadiana and negligible changes in the 
Rhine and Danube (Figure 12). For low runoff, 
the multi-model average suggests a positive 
signal in the Kemijoki, negligible change for the 
Elbe and signals low flow reductions for the rest 
of the basins. However, the range of changes 
projected by the different models is large and 
most basins span through negative and positive 
values, and the mean should not necessarily be 
treated as a robust indicator of the most likely 
sign of the change. This lowers the confidence 
in the projected signal of change for mean and 
low runoff at the basin scale. The unclear signal 
is possibly a result of two factors. The first fac-
tor is high uncertainty between the models. As 
central Europe is the region of higher uncertain-
ty on mean and low runoff projections and with 
small average changes in mean runoff, the ba-
sins located in this part of Europe (Rhine, Elbe 
and Danube) show the most ambiguous mean 
runoff signal. The second factor is the spatial 
aggregation at the basin scale. This especially 
applies to large - transnational river basins like 
Danube, as their domain extends to regions of 
both projected increases and decreases in mean 
and low runoff. On the other hand, results in far 
northern and southern European basins (Kemi-
joki and Guadiana) show more robust signals of 
potential wetter and drier futures, respectively. 
Which areas will be most drought prone?
Several southern European areas are expected 
to experience increases in duration of prolonged 
extreme droughts as illustrated in Figure 13 along 
with the certainty on the degree of the changes. At 
a world warmer by +1.5oC compared to preindus-
trial levels, there is low to medium certainty that 
small changes in drought duration (up to 10% in-
crease) from the recent past could occur mainly 
in the north and south of the Iberian Peninsula. 
Sparse areas of similar signals are projected over 
north-western France and the Midi-Pyrenees, 
Montenegro and the largest Mediterranean is-
land, Sardinia, Sicily, Crete and Cyprus. Under +2oC 
warming, the most drought prone regions are lo-
cated in southern Portugal and Spain (Guadiana 
and Segura basins) north-western Spain, west-
ern Crete (Greece), Sicily and Sardinia. It is highly 
certain that Southwest Cyprus will face moder-
ate (10-20% increase in long-term droughts. At 
+4oC, the duration of extreme long-term drought 
conditions is expected to increase covering an 
extensive area in the Mediterranean region. The 
largest and most certain increases occur at the 
southernmost latitudes, allowing us to identify 
with high certainty these areas (southern Spain, 
southern Italy, southern Greece and Cyprus) as 
the most drought prone of the European domain 
under high-end climate change. 
Figure 12. Relative change in annual mean and low discharge at +4°C compared to baseline (1981-2010) and multi-model 
range for selected river basins in Europe, from HELIX.
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Figure 13. European areas expected to experience increases in duration of prolonged extreme droughts (48-months) 
along with the certainty on the degree of the changes compared to the baseline period (1981-2010), from HELIX.
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 ᴑ Even if emissions and temperatures stabi-
lise, sea-levels will continue to rise. Climate 
change mitigation may help to reduce the 
rate of sea-level rise to manageable levels, 
but adaptation is required to help cope with 
the residual rise.
 ᴑ Coastal monitoring (e.g. tide gauges, beach 
surveys) is required to determine the en-
vironmental state, and whether acceptable 
thresholds of risk are being reached. This 
would help determine if and when adapta-
tion needs to change in order to achieve the 
management goal.
 ᴑ Intervention for successful adaptation will 
be most effective if it is bespoke, balancing 
financial, economical, societal, equitable, 
governance, legislative and environment in-
terests. Soft engineering and nature-based 
solutions are increasingly encouraged for 
a sustainable coast, but have only been 
proven in a limited number of pilot cases. 
Further research is required into resources 
and effectiveness of nature-based solutions 
(NBS). It is recognised that not everywhere 
can be protected.
 ᴑ Flexibility is required in adaptation, with mul-
tiple choices to achieve a management goal 
(e.g. defined risk levels). Adaptation path-
ways provide one structured way to achieve 
this. These can be challenging to generate 
due to barriers in planning for adaptation.
 ᴑ Governance, societal and cultural accep-
tance of flexible change presents the great-
est barrier for adaptation, particularly over 
the longer term (> 50 years). This is partic-
ularly difficult as it is hard to envisage and 
act on long-term change, when short-term 
needs are greater and more immediate than 
the long-term sustainability of the coast.
 ᴑ Priorities will depend on policy criteria, abili-
ty to pay, societal preference and technolog-
ical feasibilities. Areas with high exposure of 
people and assets (e.g. cities) demand more 
stringent protection and adaptation as risk 
levels are high. Lower population densities 
are less likely to be protected at the same 
level, and other adaptation options need to 
be explored. This will lead to equity issues, 
particularly if adaptation is paid from nation-
al budgets to which all citizens contribute.
Policy insights
The coastal fringe is a narrow border area be-
tween land and sea, usually considered as public 
domain, with management responsibilities in the 
hands of Member States (e.g. public domain), Re-
gional governments (i.e. land-use planning), mu-
nicipalities (e.g. local infrastructures and uses) 
and global level institutions (e.g. coastal sustain-
ability worldwide). These management challeng-
es span a wide range of sectors: environment, 
agriculture and fisheries, transport and tourism, 
with decision centres located in different depart-
ments and administrative levels.
However, many coasts around the world are 
facing increasing population and socio-eco-
nomic activities and simultaneously a reduc-
Key messages
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tion of available space and resources. This re-
duction will be aggravated by climatic factors, 
such as sea-level rise, changes in storminess, 
which could result in flooding, erosion, saline 
intrusion and disruption of freshwater amongst 
other factors. With increasing pressures in the 
coastal zone, conflicts of interest in coastal use 
are expected to grow. 
For many years there has been a wide set of na-
tional and international legislation addressing 
the various sectors affected by these conflicts: 
resources (Common Fisheries Policy and CAP); 
natural values (Birds and Habitat Directives, 
Biodiversity Strategy 2020); socio-economic val-
ues; flooding (Water Framework Directive) and 
integrated planning (framework for Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management). Sea-level rise adds 
additional pressures in implementing these 
policies.
Policy goals commonly deal with the mainte-
nance of the coastal strip under present con-
ditions. Future policies, including those with 
adaptation, need to better integrate the effects 
of sea-level rise into their long-term plans, but 
not to the detriment of short-term issues.
Are coasts vulnerable to climate change?
Due to the confluence of multiple marine, hy-
drological, geological and atmospheric process-
es, coasts experience many natural hazards, 
such as extreme waves, tsunamis, flooding, 
earthquakes, subsidence, landslides and ero-
sion. When these coincide with low-lying land, 
high-density populations and industry, coasts 
become hazardous places unless there is suf-
ficient protection or warning to reduce the 
number of people or assets exposed to haz-
ards. Coastal hazards evolve over time. Current-
ly sea-level rise is seen as one of the greatest 
risks to coastal environments threatening to 
increase the likelihood of flooding, salinisation 
and, at times, erosion (Wong et al., 2014). 
From 1901 to 2010, global mean sea-level rose 
by 0.19±0.02m. Scientists project that this rate 
will accelerate due to climate change (Church 
et al., 2013). The Fifth Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change report, published in 2013, 
well before the 2015 Paris Agreement on cli-
mate change mitigation (United Nations 2015), 
suggested that the likely range of global mean 
sea-levels could increase up to 0.98m by 2100 
(with respect to 1986-2005) (Church et al., 2013). 
A further rise of ‘several tenths of a metre’ could 
be possible if marine-based sectors of the Ant-
arctic ice sheet collapsed. 
Early research outputs suggests that limiting 
global temperature rise to 1.5°C as advocat-
ed in the Paris Agreement will be challenging. 
Even if emission and temperatures do stabilise, 
sea-levels will continue to rise as oceans take 
a long time to respond to change. The impacts 
of sea-level rise cannot be entirely avoided by 
climate change mitigation. Therefore, planning 
and adapting for rising sea levels over long 
timescales is essential, even if there is uncer-
tainty into the magnitude of the rise. Due to 
resource limitations, adaptation cannot take 
place everywhere, so funds need to be targeted 
to the most vulnerable or high-risk places.
Which coasts are vulnerable to sea-level rise?
Traditionally, low-lowing, densely populated 
coasts have been identified as most vulnerable 
to sea-level rise. In recent years, it has been rec-
ognised that a range of geomorphology, land-
use and governance, and financial issues are 
involved in defining who or what is vulnerable. 
Examples of these vulnerabilities are shown in 
Table 1.
Vulnerability is often due to multiple causes, 
such as those described in Table 1, which can 
vary spatially and temporally. Crucially, it is often 
the inhabitants that define the level of vulnera-
bility. For example, a good governance of coastal 
systems can lead to protection, forecasts and ad-
aptation planning can reduce vulnerability.
Compared with some other global regions, Eu-
ropean coasts are less vulnerable, mostly as 
they have a high coping capacity and coastal 
management measures, such as dikes, groynes, 
monitoring and warning systems. Although 
there are exceptions, countries in north-west 
Europe are generally more aware about the 
risks of sea-level rise than those in south-east 
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Europe. This may be because of management 
approaches, but also that sea-level rise is per-
ceived as less of a threat. Over the last decade, 
awareness of sea-level rise and action to man-
age it has substantially improved throughout 
Europe. Elsewhere, low-lying coasts in deltas 
are vulnerable. For example, at least 63 million 
people live in the low elevation zone (land <10m 
in elevation and hydrologically connected to 
the sea) in Bangladesh (Neumann et al., 2015). 
What are the impacts of sea-level rise?
Flooding, salinisation and erosion are likely to 
increase with sea-level rise unless adaptation 
is undertaken and damage costs as a result of 
extreme events also are likely to increase. Using 
the coastal impacts model, the Dynamic Inter-
active Vulnerability Assessment (Vafeidis et al., 
2008), total sea dike and residual flood costs 
were projected using a rise of 0.55m, 0.74m and 
0.94 in sea-levels by 2100 RCP8.5 for the 5th, 
50th and 95th percentiles) and for the full range 
of SSPs, assuming that modelled defences are 
upgraded as sea-level rises and socio-econom-
ic conditions change (Figure 14). 
The figure illustrates that today, total flood 
costs as percentage of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), are projected to be approximately 
0.02% of GDP. During the 21st century this is 
projected to increase fivefold to just 0.1% of 
GDP. Although a large increase, if no adapta-
tion action was undertaken, total costs could 
be in excess of 1% of GDP by 2100. These costs 
are not evenly spread throughout Europe. The 
highest total flood costs as a percentage of 
GDP are projected to be in Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Portugal. The small island states of 
Malta and Cyprus are less affected by sea-level 
rise in terms of damage costs, but may expe-
rience wider adverse effects due to their reli-
ance on tourism and marine activitieS.
What actions or policies are undertaken to re-
duce the impacts of sea-level rise?
Coastal engineering and softer adaptation op-
tions (e.g. laws and regulations) can help re-
duce the potential impacts of sea-level rise, by 
providing a hard defence or through encour-
aging building in lower risk areas. When build-
ings reach the end of their lives, the design of 
new infrastructure should consider sea-level 
rise. For instance, sea-level rise and associat-
ed storm surges have been taken into account 
in the Copenhagen Metro system, where in-
frastructure has been raised 0.25m above the 
existing level (Climate-ADAPT, 2015). However, 
many towns and villages remain vulnerable as 
they have not been planned with sea-level rise 
and wider coastal change in mind. 
Increasingly, softer methods of protection, such 
as beach nourishment, are used over hard ad-
aptation (e.g. sea walls, dikes). NBS are used too 
(e.g. dune building), and these are likely to be-
come more common in the future, yet their suc-
cess under the most extreme conditions are not 
fully known. Currently, policies of managed re-
alignment or no active intervention (in defended 
areas) are less common, particularly in semi-ur-
ban areas. With sea-level rise and greater chal-
lenges in defending the coast, these practices 
are likely to become more common.
Inevitably, coastal protection, such as the rais-
ing of sea-walls and beach nourishment, will 
focus on potentially vulnerable areas which are 
highly threatened, such as coasts where there 
are high population densities and economic ac-
tivities. Thus, currently, cities and large towns 
are highly likely to be offered protection, but 
many small areas of lower population or villag-
es will remain vulnerable.
How can we plan for sea-level rise? 
Sea-level rise is inevitable, but the rate of rise 
remains unclear. Where infrastructure has a 
long design life or other costly coastal invest-
ments require adaptation, this should ideally 
be planned decades ahead for effective plan-
ning. This means that decisions can be taken at 
the optimum time, so that it is effective envi-
ronmentally, economically, technologically and 
socially. Without forward thinking, ‘lock-in’ to 
one development scenario or ‘surprises’ where 
adverse events come together could occur. 
Adaptation plans, therefore, need to consider 
short and long term issues and provide a flexi-
ble range of options.
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Nature of 
vulnerability
Geographical 
examples Example
Geomorphology
Low-lying (open 
or deltaic), 
small or 
remote islands, 
mangrove 
forest
Maldives, 
Mekong delta 
(Vietnam), 
Netherlands
Land-uses
Nuclear power 
plants, coastal 
roads, railways, 
ports
Dawlish 
Warren 
railway (UK), 
Sizewell 
nuclear power 
station (UK), 
Flamanville 
nuclear power 
plant (France), 
Hamburg port 
(Germany)
Inhabitants
Value of land, 
population 
density, 
governance and 
management, 
finance to 
protect coast
High density 
cities 
(Barcelona, 
Istanbul), 
lower density 
agriculture 
land 
(ubiquitous), 
Ganges-
Brahmaputra 
delta (India/
Bangladesh)
Table 1. Different components of vulnerable coastlines. From RISES-AM. Photographs: Sally Brown, 
Derek Clarke
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One way to achieve this is through adaptation 
pathways – a series of sequential planning ac-
tions that lead to a low-regrets future and a 
defined management aim. An example of an 
adaptation pathway is shown in Figure 15. On 
the left hand side a number of adaptation op-
tions are listed. Each option has been evaluat-
ed against the magnitude of sea-level rise and 
time to create a pathway. Pathways are deter-
mined by adaptation tipping points, that is, 
where an adaptation option is no longer able 
to operate effectively. A change or an addi-
tional adaptation action is required to achieve 
management objectives. 
This proactive planning is flexible over time, in 
response to how the future actually unfolds. By 
exploring different pathways and considering 
path-dependency of actions, an adaptive plan 
can be designed. An adaptation pathway can fit 
into a large coastal management plan, such as 
illustrated in Figure 16. Prior to determining the 
type of adaptation, the aim and objectives of the 
management plan are set. Potential adaptation 
points are explored, before an adaptation path-
way is generated and detailed adaptive plans 
are devised to achieve this. Monitoring for po-
tential signals that indicate when the next step 
of pathway could be implemented or whether 
reassessment of the plan is needed.
What are the barriers to future coastal adapta-
tion and planning for sea-level rise?
 
In RISES-AM, technological, economic, financial 
and social (conflict) barriers to coastal adapta-
tion were analysed for case studies in Croatia, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, the Catalan Coast 
(Spain), the Danube delta (Romania), the Elbe 
estuary (Germany), Ho Chi Min City (Vietnam), 
Liverpool (UK) and Hulhumalé (Maldives). The 
results indicated that adaptation was often tech-
nologically possible, but costly. Due to the times-
cale used and high up-front investments in ben-
efit-cost analysis, only areas with very high ratios 
afforded protection. This was mainly found for 
cities and tourist areas, such as along the Cat-
alan coast. By further integration (e.g. multiple 
uses of defence structures) and taking a long-
term view, areas of lower population density may 
be able achieve more effective adaptation. 
In all coastal zones, regardless of vulnerabili-
ty, a major barrier was governance and social 
acceptability. Many stakeholders or local gov-
ernments were unwilling, or unable to invest 
in a long-term future, as they are dealing with 
today’s issues and finances, or are balancing 
conflicts of interest of stakeholders (e.g., those 
concerned with food security, tourism, nature 
protection, fisheries or shipping). Additionally, 
even when coastal protection is attractive in 
monetary terms, mobilising the financial re-
sources for this may be challenging due to large 
initial investments that only have benefits over 
the long-term. Taken together, these findings 
highlight the importance of considering the eq-
uity dimension of coastal adaptation. It is likely 
that coastal futures will diverge with rich, ur-
ban highly engineered and protected areas on 
one hand, and poorer rural areas experiencing 
blight. This represents major policy challenges.
Adaptation has to undertake wise balancing 
of financial, economical, societal, equitable, 
Figure 14. Total sea dike and flood costs as a percentage of GDP (%) for the European Union, from RISES-AM
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governance, legislative and environment inter-
ests. Furthermore, adaptation is advised to be 
integrated with wider coastal change, in con-
sultation with government, non-government 
organisations, stakeholders and other inter-
ested parties. Addressing these issues is key in 
advancing adaptation. Overall, adaptation re-
mains a matter of choice, responding to local 
needs, politics and finances.
What are the main research and policy needs?
Many coastal areas still need to consider how to 
adapt to sea-level rise. Societal change is chal-
lenging and remains a significant barrier, even 
to the generation of adaptation pathways. The 
long-term outlook of coastal protection or ad-
aptation is also sometimes unclear. Further in-
tegrated assessments are needed, for example, 
of a) available resources (e.g. volume of sand or 
freshwater) to provide protection; b) effective-
ness of the proposed interventions (e.g. limited 
duration nourishments) and c) equity of adap-
tation (e.g. in high value touristic or urban ar-
eas, compared with rural or agriculture areas).
Figure 15. A stylised example of an adaptation pathways map where a set of adaptation options (listed on the left) are 
flexibly planned over time (each indicated by its coloured path) as conditions change and reach adaptation tipping 
points (white circles) (Haasnoot et al. 2013).
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Figure 16. An example of long-term coastal planning 
through an adaptive plan, from RISES-AM.
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Key messages
Some climate-induced changes in European 
forests are expected to occur relatively smooth-
ly over time, whereas others may occur as 
“shocks”, passing thresholds or tipping points.
 ᴑ In climate change scenarios considered 
here, there is a clear north-south gradient 
regarding the impacts of climate change 
on forests, excluding other factors such 
as CO2 physiological effects and nitrogen 
deposition. High latitudes and elevations 
potentially benefit from climate change, 
and forests at low latitudes potentially 
lose as a result of projected shifts towards 
drier conditions, particularly in the Medi-
terranean region. Different regional climate 
outcomes could result in different impacts. 
 ᴑ Increased CO2 concentrations have a poten-
tially positive effect on forest productivity. In 
the absence of acclimation of trees to elevat-
ed CO2, this driver could modulate the impact 
of climatic change by either further increas-
ing forest productivity (e.g., at high latitudes 
or elevations), or at least partly compensating 
for negative climatic effects.
 ᴑ Forestry can be adapted to the changing 
climate by switching to climatically better 
adapted species, and moving towards forest-
ry systems that include more than one tree 
species at the stand scale.
 ᴑ European forests and forest products are 
significant contributors to the European 
greenhouse gas balance, constituting a 
major carbon sink that can help to reach 
EU climate targets.
Policy context
To date, there is no formal EU Forest Policy, 
but since 1998 has been an EU Forest Strategy 
(FS) and Forest Action Plan (FAP), the most re-
cent concerning the period 2007-2011. The need 
for a new FS has long been recognized, as en-
vironmental and political circumstances have 
changed considerably over the past 20 years. The 
goals for the new FS are that it should (1) develop 
and implement a common vision of multifunc-
tional and sustainable forest management in Eu-
rope; (2) define action priorities and targets; (3) 
link EU and Member State funding strategies and 
plans; (4) strengthen coherent cross-sectoral ac-
tivity planning, funding and implementation; (5) 
establish clear mechanisms for monitoring, eval-
uating and reporting; and (6) revise stakeholder 
involvement (EU 2013).
Besides the FS and FAP, many other policies are 
affecting forests, including the Resource Effi-
ciency Roadmap; the Rural Development Poli-
cy (which is providing 90% of the funding for 
European forestry); the Industrial Policy; the 
Climate and Energy Package; the Plant Health 
and Reproductive Materials Strategy; and the 
Biodiversity and Bioeconomy Strategies. Par-
ticularly relevant to EU decision-making is the 
plan to include emissions and removals from 
Land-use, Land-use Change and Forestry (LU-
LUCF) in the EU’s 2030 climate policy framework. 
Furthermore, elements of the Sustainable De-
velopment Goals are also relevant for Europe-
an forestry, particularly SDG 15.2 to promote by 
2020 the implementation of sustainable man-
agement of all types of forests.
Forests are influenced by a multitude of pro-
cesses and at many different scales over long 
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time periods, and hence management today 
only translates into effects after several de-
cades. This leads to the necessity of long-term 
planning, taking into account future trends in 
environmental and societal drivers of forest 
dynamics, and a consideration of the societal 
demands for a wide range of forest ecosystem 
services, with considerable regional differenti-
ation. Future drivers of forest change include 
increasing temperatures in cold regions; heat 
waves and severe droughts in warm regions; 
increasing frequency and severity of natural 
disturbances (e.g., forest fires, windstorms, pest 
and pathogen outbreaks); physiological effects 
of further increasing atmospheric CO2 levels; ni-
trogen deposition; global prices for timber, pulp 
and bioenergy; intrinsic value of aesthetics and 
biodiversity; and future subsidies.
Policy insights
1. What are the major impacts on forests under 
high-end scenarios?
Some changes will be occurring smoothly over 
time, whereas others will be coming as “shocks” 
(thresholds, tipping points).
‘Chronic’, continuous changes of driving forces 
like climate, atmospheric CO2 concentration or 
N deposition will lead to continuous changes 
in key forest variables such as primary produc-
tivity, and thus timber production (Figure 17), as 
well as many other ecosystem services such as 
water and air purification. Considering climate 
change alone (i.e., in the absence of natural dis-
turbances, CO2 or N fertilization effects), forest 
productivity is projected to decrease in many re-
gions of Europe by 2100, on average by 1 to 4 m3 
ha-1 year-1 (annual volume increment), i.e. about 
-10 to -50% compared to the current climate. De-
tails depend on the nature of regional climate 
change, which is uncertain due to different re-
sults from different models. In the scenarios 
considered here, regions that consistently expe-
rience reductions in forest productivity include 
the drought-prone Mediterranean basin and the 
dry continental interior of the continent. Pro-
ductivity increases of the same order of magni-
tude are expected where tree growth is currently 
limited by cold temperatures and is not expect-
ed to be limited by precipitation in the future, 
typically for high latitudes and high elevations. 
These variations will be mostly gradual (in the 
absence of other perturbations) but can happen 
more quickly and be more or less pronounced 
locally, depending on the region (Figure 17) and 
tree species (Figure 19).
These climate-driven changes are modulated by 
other drivers such as CO2 fertilization, which may 
have a positive effect on forest productivity and 
could therefore increase the positive effects of 
climate change or partly compensate its negative 
effects. Yet, the relative importance of the direct 
effects of elevated CO2 concentrations on vege-
tation productivity and biomass will depend on 
a number of factors, including ‘climate sensitiv-
ity’ (i.e., the response of the climate system to a 
given increase in CO2). HELIX is investigating this 
by simulating large-scale vegetation responses 
at different levels of global warming – 1.5°C, 2°C 
and 4°C – reached in different climate models at 
different rates (Figure 18). Under climate change 
projections from a climate model with high cli-
mate sensitivity, such as the IPSL model, warm-
ing is faster and thus reaches a higher level for a 
given CO2 concentration, compared to a low sen-
sitivity model such as the GISS model. Under the 
low sensitivity scenario, global vegetation bio-
mass increases more than under the high sce-
nario, because CO2 concentrations are higher for 
a given level of global warming (Figure 18). There 
is therefore considerable uncertainty associated 
with the simulated effects of elevated CO2 on veg-
etation productivity, which is related not only to 
the model used but also to the maintenance of 
the fertilization effect over time. Vegetation may 
indeed acclimate to higher CO2 concentrations, 
and/or other factors may become limiting (e.g., 
nutrients, water). Further research is needed to 
better understand the combined impacts of cli-
mate and elevated CO2 on forest productivity.
In addition to these gradual effects, single ex-
treme events (e.g., windthrow), and particularly 
series of such events (e.g., several drought years 
in a row), will trigger strong and sudden changes 
in both system properties (e.g., timber volume, 
carbon stock) and system dynamics, including 
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the potential for widespread tree mortality in-
duced by drought and heat waves, large changes 
in tree species abundance due to species-spe-
cific mortality, and forest expansion beyond cur-
rent ‘cold’ treelines at high latitudes and high 
elevations induced by clusters of climatically 
favourable years for tree establishment. The re-
sults in Figure 17 and Figure 19 are conservative 
estimates of negative changes to forest produc-
tivity because they exclude such disturbances.
Changes in disturbance regimes include not 
only windthrow and wildfires, but also the out-
break frequency and severity of pests and dis-
eases, such as ash wilt that is currently wiping 
out ash (Fraxinus excelsior) populations across 
Europe. Furthermore, novel species are likely to 
establish that may be disruptive to ecosystem 
function, such as the tree of heaven (Ailanthus 
altissima) that has been present in Europe for 
a long while, but now is becoming invasive in 
many European forests, or Japanese knotweed 
(Fallopia japonica) that is increasingly hinder-
ing forest regeneration under moist conditions 
across many European countries.
Thus, the many ecosystem services provided by 
forests will be affected strongly by these chang-
es in driving forces, be they chronic or induced 
by extreme events. Whether they are beneficial 
or problematic must be addressed at the re-
gional level, as the environmental impacts, as 
well as societal demands, vary strongly by re-
gion within Europe.
Figure 17. Productivity of Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris) under high-end climate scenarios, from IMPRESSIONS. Annual wood 
volume increment simulated by meta-ForClim under baseline conditions (top left, shades of green), and development 
under future climate change alone (productivity decreases from baseline conditions in red, increases from baseline con-
ditions in blue). Results are averaged over three high-end climate change scenarios (RCP8.5-HadGEM2-ES/RCA4, RCP8.5-
CanESM2/CanRCM4 and RCP8.5-IPSL-CM5A-MR/WRF) and assuming a mesic soil (water holding capacity of 15 cm).
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2. Which regions are most likely to be hardest hit 
by negative impacts of high-end climate change, 
and which regions may see a net benefit?
Under the climate change scenarios consid-
ered here, there is a clear north-south gradi-
ent regarding the impacts of climate change 
on forests (excluding other factors such as CO2 
physiological effects and nitrogen deposition). 
High latitudes and elevations potentially bene-
fit from climate change, and forests at low lati-
tudes (i.e., towards drier conditions, particularly 
in the Mediterranean region) potentially lose.
According to these simulations, forest produc-
tivity at high latitudes and high elevations is 
expected to increase (Figure 19), as temperature 
limitations on growth will be alleviated, whereas 
precipitation will stay high enough to maintain 
beneficial levels of soil moisture in spite of pro-
jected decreases in summer precipitation. Thus, 
either extant tree species will become more 
productive (e.g. Scots pine, Figures 17 and  19; 
Norway spruce, Figures 17 and 19), or it will be 
possible to use tree species that have higher 
economic value than those being used today 
but cannot be grown under current conditions 
(e.g., Sessile oak and Holm oak, Figure 19).
In continental, as well as Mediterranean ar-
eas, lower forest productivity is projected due 
to higher summer temperatures and reduced 
Figure 18. Changes in vegetation carbon at 3 Specific Warming Levels (SWLs) simulated by the ORCHIDEE dynamic global 
vegetation model driven by climate projections from different climate models, from HELIX. The centre column shows re-
sults driven by the low-sensitivity GFDL model whereas the left and right columns used the high-sensitivity IPSL model.
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Figure 19. Projected change of productivity by 2100 under climate change for two conifer (top) and two deciduous (bottom) 
tree species, from IMPRESSIONS. Changes of annual volume increment projected by meta-ForClim under low-end (left), 
medium (centre) and high-end (right) scenarios of scenarios of HECC for the time window 2070-2100 (decreases are in red, 
increases in blue). Results are presented for a mesic soil (water holding capacity of 15 cm) and averaged over two or three 
climate change scenarios depending on the severity of projected HECC: RCP4.5-GFDL-ESM2M/RCA4 and RCP4.5-MPI-ESM-
LR/CCLM4 for low-end; RCP8.5-GFDL-ESM2M/RCA4 and RCP4.5-HadGEM2-ES/RCA4 for medium; RCP8.5-HadGEM2-ES/RCA4, 
RCP8.5-CanESM2/CanRCM4 and RCP8.5-IPSL-CM5A-MR/WRF for high-end.
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summer precipitation. These climate changes 
will cause increased tree heat stress and tran-
spiration, and lead to drier soils and increased 
frequency and severity of drought events. This 
is not only expected to lead to a decrease in 
forest productivity (e.g., Scots pine, Figure 17; 
Norway spruce and Sessile oak, Figure 19), but 
it also has the potential to induce large-scale 
forest dieback, as evidenced in many regions 
worldwide over the past 15+ years already.
Some tree species will be less sensitive to fu-
ture climate change (Figure 19). Although Medi-
terranean tree species are projected to be neg-
atively affected by extreme drought events in 
the most southern parts of Europe, their growth 
is likely to remain constant or even increase 
elsewhere. This is the case for Holm oak, for ex-
ample, whose northern expansion along the At-
lantic coast of France is already being reported.
These results (Figure 19) may look different, 
particularly at the regional scale, if different cli-
mate scenarios were used. However, the range 
of scenarios spanned is quite large, ranging 
from very mild +1.5°C to true “high-end” scenar-
ios (Figure 19). Thus, the range of possible for-
est responses should be captured well by these 
simulations. 
3. What are the major needs for adaptation of 
forestry to changing driving forces?
Forestry can be adapted to the changing climate 
by switching to climatically better adapted spe-
cies, and moving towards forestry systems that 
include more than one species at the stand scale.
Given the large magnitude of high-end climate 
change, some tree species will clearly be out-
side their environmental niche in many places 
where they are productive today, such as Euro-
pean beech and Norway spruce. Thus, a change 
in tree species is needed. The timing of such 
switches needs to be considered carefully, due 
to the long production periods in forestry. On 
the one hand, forest managers must not wait 
until the first negative impacts are evident, as 
this may ruin the capital. On the other hand, 
immediately planting new species that could 
thrive under the climatic conditions of, say, 
2060 or 2080 may not be possible under current 
climatic conditions, e.g. because of their sensi-
tivity to frosts (e.g. Sessile oak and Holm oak at 
high latitudes and elevations, Figure 18) or an 
insufficient length of the growing season that 
hinders tree growth. Thus, the timing of species 
switches needs to be determined at the region-
al scale, and forest managers must take into 
account both the rates of anticipated future cli-
mate change and the ecological properties of 
extant, as well as new, tree species (so-called 
“trend-adaptive management”). The rates of 
change of the regional climate are considerably 
more uncertain than continental or global-scale 
trends, which renders climate-adaptive forest 
management all the more challenging.
Different tree species have widely different sen-
sitivities to driving forces, such as frosts, heat, or 
drought, or natural disturbances such as fire. Due 
to this and the unavoidable uncertainty in regional 
climate projections, it is likely to be highly benefi-
cial to move from single-species to multi-species 
stands, as an insurance policy against catastroph-
ic losses of timber and ecosystem services at the 
stand scale. There are multiple examples demon-
strating not only the feasibility of mixed stands, but 
also their high utility in terms of both economic 
revenue and ecosystem service provision. Exam-
ples include Scots pine (Pinus sylvestris) – Silver 
birch (Betula pendula), European Beech (Fagus 
sylvatica) – Norway spruce (Picea abies) or Norway 
spruce – Silver fir (Abies alba) stands.
4. What is the climate mitigation potential of 
European forests?
European forests and forest products are signif-
icant contributors to the European greenhouse 
gas balance, constituting a major carbon sink 
that can help to reach EU climate targets.
Forests play an important role in the green-
house gas balance of Europe, as forests and 
their products constitute a carbon pool that 
continues to increase, thus providing a net sink 
and helping to mitigate EU carbon emissions.
EU forests and the forest sector currently pro-
duce an overall climate mitigation impact that 
amounts to about 13% of the total EU emis-
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sions. Thus, they are a contributor to achieving 
climate targets, particularly the goal of limit-
ing the global average temperature increase 
to less than 2°C above the pre-industrial level, 
although forests and their products alone are 
certainly insufficient for reaching such goals.
Forest products are also contributing to the 
bioenergy goals of the EU, as all wood products 
can – at least in theory – be burnt at the end of 
their lifetime. Hence it is not only direct bioen-
ergy harvesting from forests that is important, 
but also the entire value chain of forest prod-
ucts as building materials, furniture, etc.
The large current sink strength of European for-
ests implies that forestry could also contribute 
to achieving negative emissions (i.e., taking up 
more carbon than is being emitted by human 
activities) at the EU level, and hence they should 
be factored into corresponding policy targets.
The future climate mitigation potential of Euro-
pean forests cannot currently be assessed, as 
this depends strongly not only on the carbon 
that is stored on a per area basis, but also and 
probably even to a larger extent on total forest 
area, which results from competition with other 
land-uses (agriculture, urban, etc.). Results on 
these areal changes are not available yet from 
the IMPRESSIONS project, but can be supplied 
soon. However, the Forest Information System 
for Europe (FISE) and the forest pattern viewer 
service provided by EFDAC contain projections 
of these changes based on earlier sources (cf. 
http://forest.jrc.ec.europa.eu/).
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Key messages
 ᴑ Under high-end climate change scenarios, 
the combined effects of climatic and so-
cio-economic change pose high risks to bio-
diversity across Europe. There is consider-
able risk of major transformations of many 
ecosystems in southern Europe.
 ᴑ The greatest scope for gains in biodiversi-
ty arises from potential land abandonment, 
mainly in northern Europe. The magnitude 
and uncertainty of climate and land-use 
change in parts of southern Europe, imply 
a need for intervention to avoid the loss of 
key connecting habitats and the worst pos-
sible outcomes for conservation.
 ᴑ Rates of climate change under high emis-
sions scenarios would largely be in excess 
of the ability of species to keep up through 
dispersal, although the extent to which 
this becomes a problem will depend on 
the length of time the climate continues to 
warm.
 ᴑ Support for nature conservation at local 
and national scales has been demonstrated 
to be an important factor in maintaining the 
scale and connectivity of natural areas.
 ᴑ Land for nature conservation fundamentally 
depends on food demand and the intensi-
ty of agricultural production, with intensive 
production allowing land-sparing for con-
servation, and extensive production limiting 
the scope for nature conservation, except 
through multifunctional land-uses.
 ᴑ Protecting conservation areas to prevent 
intensification in one location may lead to 
knock-on effects on other habitats else-
where, for some scenarios.
 ᴑ Nature-based approaches can support tran-
sition away from non-renewable to renew-
able natural capital and can be associated 
with increased co-production and provision 
of ecosystem services. The widespread use 
of nature-based solutions provides many 
opportunities for synergies across policy 
objectives, including benefits to both cli-
mate change adaptation and mitigation. As 
such, nature-based solutions can enable 
the transition from a resource-intensive 
towards a more resource-efficient and sus-
tainable growth model.
Policy context
A key aim of Article 2 of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change is to limit 
warming so that ecosystems (and biodiversity) 
can adapt naturally to climate change. Realization 
of the risks of not meeting Article 2 led, in part, to 
the signing of the Paris Accords or Agreement with 
the goal of limiting temperature rise to < 2°C rela-
tive to pre-industrial levels. However, meeting this 
target could potentially jeopardize not only Article 
2, but also the Aichi targets and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) through poorly man-
aged land-use change (especially bioenergy im-
pacts on food production and biodiversity). 
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The EU Birds and Habitats Directives led to the 
establishment of the EU-wide Natura 2000 net-
work of protected areas. The EU also has ad-
opted the Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 “to halt 
the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services 
in the EU by 2020”1. Target 11 of the strategy 
aims to ensure that terrestrial and inland wa-
ter, and coastal and marine areas, especially 
areas of particular importance for biodiversity 
and ecosystem services “are conserved through 
effectively and equitably managed, ecologically 
representative and well-connected systems of 
protected areas and other effective area-based 
conservation measures, and integrated into the 
wider landscapes and seascapes”2. Many of the 
actions required to meet these targets are also 
consistent with ecosystem-based adaptation 
measures for climate change. A Green Infra-
structure Strategy was adopted in 2013 to pro-
mote the deployment of green infrastructure 
in urban and rural areas, with the Natura 2000 
network an important part of this. The develop-
ment of green infrastructure will also enhance 
the connectivity of the Natura 2000 network and 
strengthen the resilience of sites, including to 
climate change. For marine ecosystems, the Ma-
rine Strategy Framework Directive (2008) aims 
“to achieve Good Environmental Status (GES) of 
the EU’s marine waters by 2020 and to protect 
the resource base upon which marine-related 
economic and social activities depend”3. 
What are the key 
vulnerabilities of nature to 
high-end climate change 
(HECC) and other drivers 
of change?
Impacts on coastal habitats
Coastal habitats will be impacted by sea-level 
rise (SLR) and warming, especially if HECC leads 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/
comm2006/pdf/2020/1_EN_ACT_part1_v7%5B1%5D.pdf
2 http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/
3 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX 
T/?uri=CELEX:32008L0056
to 1m of SLR and >2oC warming. RISES-AM ex-
plored the impact of SLR on marsh habitat in 
the Ebro Delta and Elbe Estuary and on beaches 
at the global level, focusing on geomorphologi-
cal impacts. In deltas and estuaries, SLR is more 
critical than in other coastal areas, since: 1) their 
large areas at low elevations (often 0 to 5 m) en-
hance the risk of flooding; 2) the loss of land ele-
vation due to sediment compaction (subsidence) 
adds to the eustatic SLR; and, 3) there is a strong 
dependence on water and sediment inputs from 
river basins, whose decline, due to dams and 
intensive water use, leads to coastal erosion 
and salt stress. Coastal habitats respond to SLR 
through natural mechanisms, such as flooding, 
sedimentation and vertical accretion. Feedback 
between inundation depth and suspended sed-
iment concentrations allows marshes to adjust 
their elevation to even a strong change in the 
rate of SLR, provided there is enough sediment 
in the system. In beach environments and barri-
er islands, SLR and/or the frequency and surge 
level of marine storms increase the frequency 
and intensity of overwash ensuring more depo-
sition of sand on beach crests and back-shores. 
This increases the elevation of the beach and the 
whole beach profile migrates landward. 
In IMPRESSIONS, the modelling of the potential 
impact of HECC on coastal habitats in Europe 
showed a mixed response for the 2050s. Salt 
marshes showed some losses, while coastal 
grazing marsh showed little change, with in-
creases in intertidal flats in the Mediterranean 
and Baltic and decreases around the North 
Sea and British Isles. Minor increases in inland 
marsh were projected in Finland, while under 
the same scenario large increases were project-
ed in Eastern Europe and with smaller amounts 
in Sweden, Ireland and Germany. 
Impacts on terrestrial species distribu-
tions and habitat
HECC poses both direct and indirect challenges 
for species, influencing both the species them-
selves and their habitats. These habitats are 
also affected by societies changing priorities for 
land-use, which are themselves influenced by 
both climate and socio-economic changes. Fig-
ure 20 shows model results for the climate and 
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habitat suitability of 112 species for three RCPs 
with increasing levels of climatic warming. Even 
under low-end lower-end scenarios of HECC 
(RCP 2.6) 13% of Europe loses over 10 species and 
28% loses more than one species. HECC leads to 
considerably greater impacts: more than 10 spe-
cies lose lose all suitable climate space and/or 
habitat in 28% of European grid cells under RCP 
4.5, which increases to 36% under RCP 8.5. Whilst 
some species may be able to adapt and gain 
access to new appropriate climate and habitats 
these are mostly in northern Europe and much of 
the south will see significant changes in its na-
tive biodiversity, with a potential for colonisation 
by some species from North Africa. Furthermore, 
whether species are able to access the new cli-
mate space will very much depend on the dis-
persal capabilities of the individual species and 
the availability of suitable habitats (see below).
The impact of HECC (global warming levels from 
+2°C to + 6.5°C) on >75,000 species of terrestrial 
plants, birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibi-
ans has been explored (Warren et al., 2013). The 
results are presented in terms of Refugia (where 
the climate remains suitable for >75% of the spe-
cies modelled), Areas of Concern (AoC), where 
the climate becomes unsuitable for >75% of the 
species modelled), and a measure of adaptation 
effort (see Adaptation section). 
Here, we provide preliminary results for plants 
and birds as these are relevant for the Habitat 
and Birds Directives. Figure 21 shows the number 
of climate models projecting a given cell to be an 
AoC for plant species. Even at +2°C, globally, some 
areas of southern Europe have a small risk of be-
coming unsuitable for >75% of the plants. Under 
HECC, the risk increases substantially in southern 
Europe and becomes widespread at +6°C. Thus, 
many parts of Europe risk becoming climatically 
unsuitable for a large percentage of plant spe-
cies with habitats under considerable pressure 
to transform into different habitat types putting 
the work completed under the Habitats Directive 
at risk. Moreover, this does not account for the 
additional, potential risks arising from land-use 
change (see the section on vulnerability).
Figure 22 shows the number of climate models 
projecting a given cell to be an AoC for bird spe-
cies. The climate remains suitable for a great-
er number of birds than for plants. Only under 
global warming of 6°C or more do large areas in 
southern Europe become unsuitable for greater 
than 75% of bird species, assuming no dispersal. 
However, even if the climate remains suitable 
for many species, habitat transformation would 
lead to changes in bird communities and eco-
system functioning. Even if areas do not become 
AoCs, Figure 23 shows that much of southern Eu-
2050s RCP 2.6 (baseline socio-economics)
RCP4.5 (Baseline socio-
economics)
RCP 8.5 (baseline socio-
economics)
Figure 20. Change in climate and habitat suitability for 112 species under increasing levels of climate change, from 
IMPRESSIONS.
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rope would cease to be a climatic refugium for 
birds, meaning that large areas would become 
climatically unsuitable for between 25% and 
75% of bird species. This suggests that actions 
put in place under the Birds Directive would be 
at increasing risk with increasing temperatures. 
The results indicate that with increasing tem-
peratures there is risk of major transformations 
of many ecosystems in southern Europe.
Adaptation opportunities 
There are a number of ways in which species can 
adapt to climate change, but the modelling used 
in IMPRESSIONS and HELIX is only able to capture 
aspects of dispersal and connectivity. Available 
information from paleoecological studies shows 
that movement has been a common response 
to climatic changes in the past. While it is true 
that species lacking the ability to move may be 
able to develop other adaptive responses, such 
as epigenetic changes, evolution, or the expres-
sion of phenotypic plasticity, the data on climate 
changes and past mass-extinction events would 
indicate that this has not commonly occurred in 
the past, although there are some exceptions.
Dispersal and connectivity
The ability of species to move (disperse) in re-
sponse to HECC is dependent on: 1) rates of cli-
Figure 22. Bird Areas of Concern (climate becomes unsuit-
able for >75% of the species modelled) in Europe at 2°C, 
~4.5°C, and ~6.5°C global warming above pre-industrial 
with no dispersal, from HELIX.
Figure 21. Plant Areas of Concern (climate becomes un-
suitable for >75% of the species modelled) in Europe at 
2°C, ~4.5°C, and ~6.5°C above pre-industrial (no disper-
sal, from HELIX).
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mate change relative to dispersal capability; 2) 
corridors or connectivity of suitable habitats and 
climates; and, 3) lack of barriers (fragmentation, 
urbanization). HECC rates will largely be in excess 
of the ability of species to keep up through dis-
persion, although whether this becomes a prob-
lem will depend on how long the climate con-
tinues to warm. If the climate stabilizes, species 
may be able to catch up, but this is limited by 
the size of the climatic range and the duration 
HECC. However, results suggest that the habitat 
changes accompanying HECC will make this diffi-
cult. Moreover, species with small climatic ranges 
would be at risk of extirpation since there is no 
remaining suitable climate space. 
HELIX looked at adaptation in two ways: a) a 
measure of adaptation effort and b) a measure 
of necessary connectivity. The adaptation ef-
fort index (AEI) (Figure 23) combines the Refu-
gia and Area of Concern Maps. The more likely 
an area remains a refugium, the less specific 
adaptation action is required. Thus, the higher 
the AEI the more likely that current manage-
ment practices would be suitable. Regions with 
values of AEI between 10 and -10 are likely to 
require some revision to management plans. 
However, as AEI drops below -10, current man-
agement practices would no longer be suitable 
for maintaining existing habitat. It is possible 
that the best adaptation would be to facilitate 
Figure 23. Maps of Adaptation Effort Indices for 2°C, 
~4.5°C and ~6.5°C global warming for plants (see text for 
an explanation of the indices), from HELIX.
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the change from one climatic type to another 
(for plant communities), as with plantations 
and ‘restoration’. The Connectivity Necessity 
Index (CNI) (Figure 24) indicates which areas 
would benefit the most from habitat connec-
tivity as an adaptation strategy. A CNI of 0 indi-
cates no difference in status as a refugium with 
or without dispersal in the models. The higher 
the CNI the greater the difference between the 
number of models projecting a region would be 
a refugium with and without dispersal. A CNI of 
21 indicates a cell would be a refugium if spe-
cies could freely disperse, and would not be a 
refugium if they could not. With 2°C warming, 
there are only a few areas where connectivty 
makes a large difference in refugia status. With 
increasing temperatures, the necessity of con-
nectivity and larger intact ecosystems increas-
es. However, increasing temperatures are also 
likely to lead to greater land-use change and 
fragmentation. Thus, the use of connectivity as 
an adaptation option becomes more import-
ant, but less likely under HECC.
Protected areas
Modelling shows that increasing protected ar-
eas (PAs) can lead to significant changes in 
land-use, and habitat conservation. PAs are in-
creased by preventing a habitat (e.g. extensive 
forest and agriculture) from being replaced by 
a more intensive habitat (e.g. intensive agricul-
ture, urban). New PAs can also be created from 
the existing Natura2000 network by: a) buffer-
ing existing sites, e.g. protecting additional for-
est area by expanding the PA boundary; or, b) 
building connectivity, e.g. targeting cells with 
large forest areas that are not currently protect-
ed, thus broadening the spatial distribution of 
PAs and reducing inter-site distances. Figure 25 
shows that both methods for land allocation 
(buffer/connect) lead to different regional pat-
terns in habitat cover (%) and that regional 
trade-offs result from increasing PA. Protect-
ing forests leads to a 25% decrease in exten-
sive grassland in northern Europe as a result 
of shifts in the land-use system, as without PA, 
agriculture, rather than forestry would have oc-
cupied the areas that become protected forests 
in western, central and southern Europe. As a 
result, when forest areas in these locations are 
prevented from intensifying (i.e. from becoming 
agriculture), it is necessary to use land else-
where to satisfy food demand. Thus, the model 
projects northern Europe as developing inten-
sive agriculture in place of both forests and ex-
tensive grasslands to compensate. This is im-
portant as it shows that in some scenarios, PAs 
that prevent intensification and protect habitats 
in one location may affect other habitats else-
where. Also, whilst protecting forests increases 
forest cover relative to the same scenario with 
no increase in PA, total forest cover decreases 
relative to the present by up to 30%, even when 
Figure 25. Regional changes in habitats resulting from changes in protected areas (up to x2 current PA), from IMPRESSIONS. 
Changes are relative to the future scenario (2050, CSMK3 A1 mid) with 100% current day PA. Boxes represent IPCC’s five 
European regions. N: Northern; At: Atlantic; Al: Alpine; Co: Continental; S: Southern and EU: overall European change.
Forest Area Grassland Area Forest Area Grassland Area
Key Increase Forest PA Increase Grassland PA
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forests are protected. This is because without 
the species adapting to meet new climatic con-
ditions many forest areas become climatically 
unsuitable leading to forest loss even within in 
PAs. This stresses the importance of foresight in 
management within PAs, and the need to con-
sider a PA network that adapts spatially to HECC. 
When expanding PAs to target extensive grass-
land, buffering gives a decrease in extensive 
farmland in Atlantic and Alpine regions and a 
concentration of grasslands in the southern and 
continental regions. This is because although 
the Atlantic and Alpine areas would be the most 
profitable in a situation without an increase in 
PA, when buffering is used to constrain extensive 
grasslands to areas surrounding existing PAs, 
these areas are not used and extensive grass-
lands cluster around existing PAs in the south-
ern and continental regions. This means that in 
scenarios where buffering is used to generate 
bigger areas of connected habitat it could be at 
the expense of placing these habitats in areas 
with the largest economic benefits. It is import-
ant to note, however, that ‘extensive grassland’ 
reflects areas of extensive livestock farming, 
rather than “natural grasslands” per se and so, 
its allocation is driven by livestock profitability. 
This highlights the real-world trade-offs in terms 
of the regional context of conservation particu-
larly for habitats with mixed agricultural, cultural 
and conservation benefits. Should we buffer and 
preserve large areas for habitat and cultural her-
itage reasons, or is it possible to recreate these 
conditions elsewhere, and if so can/should we 
prioritise agricultural production and manage 
land for species habitats elsewhere? Whatever 
the answer, for both forests and grasslands any 
changes in PAs will have significant land-use im-
plications that will vary considerably by region 
even under relatively moderate climates.
Permeable landscapes - less intensive land-use
Permeable landscapes allow species to move 
across them, facilitating the colonisation of new 
areas, or dispersal or other behavioural move-
ments. Permeable landscapes are often less 
intensively used or unmanaged areas, or have 
specific features to facilitate movement, such as 
ecological corridors. IMPRESSIONS modelling for 
the 2050s shows a mixed response, with areas 
of southern Europe and Scandinavia mostly re-
ducing or maintaining their area of extensively 
farmed land, whilst increasing the area of un-
managed land. Elsewhere, there is little change, 
or an increase, as with unmanaged land in parts 
of eastern Europe. Areas of increase have the po-
tential to improve the availability of habitat and 
landscape permeability particularly for endemic 
and non-agricultural species, facilitating adapta-
tion. Such land-use change may, however, come 
at the cost of intensive farming with higher agri-
cultural yields from more fertilizer and pesticide 
use that would affect agricultural species, as well 
as reducing water quality and climate mitigation.
Managing adaptation in coastal habitats
Natural mechanisms involved in coastal marsh 
resilience to SLR can be enhanced through 
management measures based on natural sys-
tem functioning and ecological engineering 
(Ibáñez et al. 2014). Enhancing inorganic and 
organic accretion in wetlands is the main goal 
of adaptation management to cope with SLR. 
In general, the contribution of organic matter 
to vertical accretion is more relevant in fresher 
(water) habitats, so the control of marsh salinity 
with fresh water inputs to avoid salt intrusion 
due to SLR, or even to promote a change to a 
fresher habitat is an option under certain con-
ditions. For inorganic accretion, the two main 
sources of sediment inputs are rivers and the 
near-shore environment. In both cases, man-
agement consists of restoring the hydrological 
fluxes and connectivity between the coastal 
wetland and the fluvial or marine systems (or 
both). In many cases, restoring sediment fluxes 
requires more ‘permeable’ human infrastruc-
tures such as dams, levees and dikes.
To what extent are current nature conservation 
policies and practices robust to HECC?
Biodiversity vulnerability and the scope for suc-
cessful conservation under HECC depends on 
the interplay of climate and human land-use. 
Even if conservation is prioritised, the need for 
basic resources such as food, water, energy and 
timber means that natural areas may suffer 
loss of extent and coherence independently of 
any direct climate impacts (Heller and Zavale-
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ta, 2009). Climatic and anthropogenic drivers 
are likely to work in concert because the areas 
most affected by climate change will require 
the greatest adaptations in land management, 
therefore generating significant disturbances 
to natural systems (Hansen et al., 2001; Opdam 
and Wascher 2004; Sutherland et al., 2009).
Understanding these drivers of change in con-
servation requires the integration of climatic, 
biophysical and land management models. In-
tegrated simulations suggest that the combined 
effects of climatic and socio-economic changes 
make a loss of biodiversity across Europe highly 
likely in the future, with the greatest scope for 
gains arising from potential land abandonment, 
mainly in northern Europe (Brown et al., 2015). 
Conversely, the magnitude and uncertainty of 
climate and land-use change in parts of south-
ern Europe implies a need for intervention to 
avoid the worst possible outcomes for con-
servation and to identify strategies to support 
both the human and natural systems in those 
areas. However, these results are based on eco-
nomically rational decision-making and do not 
account for the effect of ecosystem services 
and conservation preferences on land man-
agement choices. IMPRESSIONS has used hu-
man behavioural models to study scenarios of 
individual and collective (political) dedication 
to conservation alongside climatic, economic 
and other drivers of change. This demonstrat-
ed that support for nature conservation at local 
and national scales was an important factor in 
maintaining scale and connectivity of natural 
areas (Brown et al., 2016). However, achieving 
preferred levels of conservation depends fun-
damentally on food demand and the intensity 
of agricultural production, with intensive pro-
duction allowing land-sparing for conserva-
tion in other areas, and extensive production 
limiting scope for conservation except through 
multifunctional land-uses. These relationships 
were found to hold across scenarios, suggesting 
that areas subject to the greatest climate-in-
duced land-use change (primarily towards the 
northern or southern extremes of Europe) will 
pose the greatest challenges, as well as oppor-
tunities, for nature conservation, requiring tar-
geted political intervention if natural systems 
are to be protected (Holman et al., 2017). 
Synergies between adapta-
tion and mitigation
Synergies can occur between various responses 
to climate change, including between adapta-
tion actions in the same sector (e.g. urban trees 
can both reduce runoff and also urban heat is-
land effects) or in a different sector. Synergies 
can also occur between adaptation and mitiga-
tion. Clearly, at the global scale, mitigation re-
duces the amount of adaptation that is required 
to reduce climate change impacts to a partic-
ular level. It also reduces the rate of warming 
and therefore facilitates natural adaptation by 
ecosystems and species which are more likely 
to disperse sufficiently rapidly to track their cli-
mate envelopes. A number of adaptation mea-
sures that also could provide mitigation benefits 
have been identified (see Berry et al., 2015). For 
example, expansion of forests can increase car-
bon storage, as can wetland/coastal habitat cre-
ation providing they are managed to avoid po-
tential increases in greenhouse gas emissions.
Some adaptation measures modelled in RIS-
ES-AM do have synergies with mitigation, espe-
cially those related to the use of coastal wet-
lands to increase resilience to SLR and enhance 
carbon sequestration. The restoration of coastal 
wetlands is a NBS, often used in combination 
with grey infrastructure, to increase the buff-
ering capacity of coastal, estuarine and delta-
ic systems against climate change. In addition, 
coastal wetlands can be managed to optimize 
the sediment accretion rate (both inorganic and 
organic components) and thus increase the rate 
of carbon sequestration. Increasing land eleva-
tion with sediment supply from the river is a way 
to adapt to relative SLR and at the same time in-
crease carbon sequestration in rice paddy fields. 
The stabilization of coastal sedimentary depos-
its through (re)vegetation or other nature-based 
solution (NBS) will reduce erosion and flooding 
risks and thus the need for a more continu-
ous and artificial maintenance. This conclusion 
is applicable not only for deltas and low lying 
coasts, but also for most of the coastal systems 
considered, as fewer resources and less ener-
gy will be required to maintain a given land-sea 
border and thus it will reduce the carbon foot-
print of coastal protection.
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How can nature conservation policies and 
practices be adapted to better deal with HECC?
The potential impacts of climate change on bio-
diversity will need to be taken into account in 
any future conservation policy or Biodiversity 
Strategy. However, as the integrated modelling 
has shown, there is a need also to take into 
consideration how climate change responses 
and policies in other sectors affect biodiversity, 
and how biodiversity policies (such as through 
restoration) impact climate mitigation and ad-
aptation. Opportunities exist to reduce the 
pressures on biodiversity and to enhance na-
ture conservation. Some of these might involve 
trade-offs, but others could provide synergies. 
For example, in the Water Framework Directive, 
waters in good ecological status are likely also 
to deliver water of a higher quality for domes-
tic supply, while the appropriate application of 
green infrastructure and nature-based solu-
tions have the potential to contribute to con-
servation, while also contributing to human 
well-being and other societal challenges, in-
cluding climate mitigation and adaptation. 
Nature-based solutions
Nature-based solutions (NBS) include climate 
change adaptation and mitigation measures, 
but they can also address other issues, such 
as sustainable urbanisation, restoring degrad-
ed ecosystems and enhancing risk manage-
ment and resilience. In IMPRESSIONS, the main 
modelled NBS is the retreat of flood defences, 
through managed re-alignment. Retreat did not, 
however, cause a reduction in the number of 
people flooded or the damages arising at the 
European scale because the areas of habitat 
increase were relatively small and the habitats 
often not located in appropriate places. Nev-
ertheless, managed retreat has been shown in 
other studies to be an effective NBS.
In RISES-AM, NBS were analysed in the Rhine and 
Ebro deltas. The restoration of coastal wetlands, 
often in combination with grey infrastructure, 
increases the buffer capacity of coastal, estua-
rine and deltaic systems against climate change. 
This is the case for the room-for-the-river type of 
solution that is being implemented in the Rhine 
Delta, an adaptation measure that provides 
buffer capacity against both marine and fluvial 
flooding risks associated with extreme events. 
Increasing land elevation or “rising grounds” as 
it has been named is a promising NBS that can 
be potentially applied to many low-lying areas to 
adapt to climate change. For instance, sediment 
supply from the river was a way to adapt to rela-
tive sea-level rise that was applied in the past in 
the Ebro Delta to create rice fields in salt-marsh 
areas. The enhanced capture of sediments was 
also how many polders were developed in the 
Rhine Delta. The supply of fresh water and sed-
iment to swamps and marshes is also being 
applied in the Mississippi Delta. These types of 
NBS can also be applied to other delta systems 
worldwide, such as the Asian mega-deltas.
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Key messages
 ᴑ Higher temperatures could have significant 
impacts for health and wellbeing including 
human comfort, particularly in southern Eu-
rope. 
 ᴑ Under high-end scenarios, high tempera-
tures after mid-century would be expected 
to alter patterns of daily living and working. 
 ᴑ Autonomous adaptation could offset signif-
icant impacts but there will be limits to ad-
aptation to higher temperatures. 
 ᴑ Adaptation strategies relating to new build 
and retrofitting of dwellings has implica-
tions for mitigation policy unless energy-in-
tensive space-cooling is avoided. 
 ᴑ Climate change is projected to increase 
child undernutrition in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca and South Asia, but research is needed 
to understand the full implications of the 
high-end scenarios. 
Policy context
Extreme weather has significant impacts on 
economic sectors, as well as adverse social and 
health impacts on European populations, and 
impacts on populations outside the EU28 will 
also have implications for EU policy. 
Climate change will increase the frequency and 
the intensity of hot weather - which is associ-
ated with significant acute impacts on mortal-
ity and morbidity. All populations are affected 
by high temperatures, but it is not known how 
quickly populations can adapt or the limits to 
this adaptation. High temperatures are likely to 
have future effects on the capacity to under-
take activities outdoors - whether for leisure or 
employment. One direct effect of a higher num-
ber of very hot days is likely to be the “slow-
ing down” of work and other daily activities. 
Whether it occurs through “self-pacing” (which 
reduces output) or occupational interventions 
(which increases costs), the end result is lower 
labour productivity and possibly an increase in 
occupational heat injury and death. There will 
also be health benefits from milder winters in 
terms of the reduction of cold-related mortality 
or morbidity.
Adaptation measures to reduce heat health ef-
fects include heat-wave plans, improvements in 
urban planning and housing design (including 
retrofitting) and social protection measures for 
older and vulnerable citizens. Future changes 
in housing and infrastructure have the poten-
tial to reduce the regional or local burden of 
heat-related mortality. 
There will be important differences in impacts 
within Europe: populations in southern Europe 
appear to be most sensitive to hot weather, and 
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also will experience the highest heat exposures 
in the future in absolute terms. Populations in 
central and northern Europe are also vulnera-
ble to heat-wave events. The adaptive capaci-
ty of populations is likely to vary significantly 
within Europe.
Policy insights
What is the impact on acute mortality from 
high summer temperatures under high-end 
scenarios and a changing urban environment? 
Climate change is projected to increase heat-re-
lated mortality in all populations but impacts 
are greatest under high rates of warming (in-
dicated by RCP8.5 emissions scenario). Results 
are presented as absolute annual numbers 
and not rates meaning population size needs 
to be taken into account. Figure 26 illustrates 
that future burdens without adaptation are 
very different across Europe, with southern 
and central Europe showing particularly large 
increases in heat-related mortality. Currently, 
high temperatures have the greatest effect on 
acute mortality in southern Europe, shown in 
several epidemiological studies. As would be 
expected, the impacts are greatest under the 
highest warming (RCP8.5) and towards the end 
of the century. The impact of climate variabili-
ty is also apparent. This model projects higher 
estimates of mortality effects than a previous 
model that used a linear association to mod-
el the association between temperature and 
mortality.
Urban heat islands (UHI) are a factor in many 
urban settlements and refer to the difference in 
temperatures measured inside and outside the 
urbanised area. High ambient temperatures have 
impacts on thermal comfort, productivity, ener-
gy use, and human health. Several studies have 
quantified the role of the built environment in in-
creasing outdoor temperatures. The UHI intensity 
is typically higher at night than during the day 
and shows seasonal variation, typically greater 
in winter than in summer. Results from RUGv4.0 
show that urbanisation trends in Europe are fairly 
modest under the range of SSP scenarios. Thus, 
changes in outdoor temperature due to increases 
in high density urban areas are not likely to be a 
key factor for future heat-related mortality. 
Figure 26. Future annual heat-related mortality in Europe, with and without climate change in 2050s. {no adaptation or 
acclimatization) [Preliminary results, from IMPRESSIONS].
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How does population growth and aging, and 
population movement interact to affect health 
risks under high-end scenarios? 
The impact of climate change on heat-related 
mortality is very dependent on future rates of 
population aging. Population growth is only a de-
terminant to the extent that the number of older 
persons is increased. Populations in Europe are 
aging, and projections show that the number of 
elderly and very elderly is likely to increase dra-
matically after mid-century1. Studies of healthy 
aging also indicate that there is considerable 
uncertainty about the vulnerability of Europe’s 
older citizens to weather extremes. 
Where and when will temperature exceed citi-
zen’s comfort?
Much is known about human responses to local 
variations to temperature and humidity, and the 
weather conditions that are reported as pleas-
ant or tolerable. However, there is only limited 
value in mapping these indices at large scale 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demogra-
phy-migration-projections/population-projections-data
now and in the future as individual responses 
will be determined by local bioclimatic con-
ditions, particularly if the person is indoors. 
Limited evidence regarding current behaviour 
indicates that people have a relatively high tol-
erance for high temperatures for leisure activi-
ties and more research is needed to determine 
the thresholds which are likely to trigger signif-
icant changes in human behaviour. 
However, significant changes in temperature 
are projected. For example, Figure 27 illustrates 
the increased frequency of heat alerts and heat 
alarms in two populations in Hungary, based 
on thresholds determined by the local public 
health agency. 
During the summer, increases in indoor over-
heating are likely to increase discomfort and, 
potentially, a rise in cooling demand following 
an increased uptake of active cooling systems. 
Modelling studies suggest that as the climate 
becomes warmer, it will be increasingly challeng-
ing for naturally ventilated buildings to maintain 
comfortable indoor thermal conditions using 
passive ventilation-based measures alone (Zero 
Carbon Hub, 2015a, b, c).
Figure 27. Increased frequency of heat alerts and heat alarms in Szekszard and Veszprem, Hungary, based on RCP4.5 (left) 
and RCP 8.5 (right) from IMPRESSIONS. Note the y axes scales are not the same.
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How will climate change affect malnutrition 
under high-end scenarios?
Malnutrition is a significant health problem in 
low- and middle-income countries, and is a pri-
ority within EU policy on international develop-
ment. Child undernutrition is associated with 
mortality, morbidity, and lifelong consequences 
such as reduced learning and earning capac-
ity. In 2011, 165 million children were stunted, 
contributing to around 45% of all child deaths 
(Black et al., 2013). 
Impact estimates vary by scenario and mod-
el, but results so far suggests that moderate 
to high climate change may increase stunting 
by 23% in parts of Africa and 62% in South Asia 
by 2050 compared to a world without climate 
change. The implications of ‘high-end’ scenario 
(assessed via RCP8.5) indicate even higher ef-
fects on stunting, particularly in South Asia. The 
model assumed that the relationships between 
the observed variables and the dimensions of 
food security are constant over space and time. 
The causation of stunting is complex, as social 
and economic factors that determine access to 
food are as important as food production or 
food availability. To date, global food securi-
ty assessments have focussed on the pathway 
from climate change to reduced crop produc-
tivity to child undernutrition, with the key input 
variable “post-trade national-level per capita 
calorie availability”. Many other key factors that 
will shape future nutrition are not directly con-
sidered within integrated assessment models. 
Research for IMPRESSIONS takes a ‘food securi-
ty’ perspective and explicitly represents dimen-
sions for ‘availability’ (i.e. how much food avail-
able?), ‘accessibility’ (i.e. can people access the 
available food), and ‘utilisation’ (i.e. are people 
able benefit from the food they have access to; 
for example, repeated episodes of diarrhoeal 
disease may prevent this). This provides a more 
detailed analysis of the factors contributing to 
future patterns of undernutrition under differ-
ent climatefutures. 
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Key messages
 ᴑ Artificial surface extent could vary from 
about 4% of the European land area today, to 
approximately 4% to 9% of that area by 2100, 
depending on the socio-economic scenario.
 ᴑ Population change is a key driver of fu-
ture artificial surface expansion. However, 
changes to the demographic profile of this 
population, their residential preferences 
and planning legislation have the potential 
to restrict or magnify patterns of growth. A 
declining population does not imply a static 
artificial surface extent in the presence of 
changing residential preferences.
 ᴑ The contrasting residential profiles of each 
socio-economic scenario influence the ex-
tent and location of artificial surface. The 
dense urban networks of Belgium, the Neth-
erlands, western Germany and southern 
United Kingdom promote concentrations 
of future suburban development. This is in 
contrast to the ‘hotspots’ of development 
that are more sparsely distributed across, 
for example, Spain, Portugal and the Nordic 
countries.
 ᴑ Sprawling urban development could place 
greater pressure on sensitive ecosystems as 
the population in close proximity to protect-
ed areas, water bodies and coastal regions 
increases.
Introduction
The artificial surfaces associated with urban 
areas cover approximately 4% of land surfaces 
within Europe. Despite this, cities, towns and 
suburban areas are home to over two-thirds 
(72.4%) of the European (EU-28) population (Eu-
rostat, 2015). Furthermore, urban areas account 
for ~80% of energy use (EC, 2016a), contribute 
~69% of European CO2 emissions (EEA, 2015) and 
generate up to 85% of Europe’s GDP (EC, 2016a). 
It is in this context that urban areas are key in 
confronting a number of global challenges.
Urban areas are embedded across European pol-
icy; it is estimated that two thirds of all European 
sectoral policies have an impact on urban areas 
(Van Lierop, 2015). Approximately 50% (~80-90 
billion Euros) of the current European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) will be invested in ur-
ban areas (EC, 2014) with sustainable urban de-
velopment prioritised in Articles 7 to 9 (EU, 2013). 
Objective eight of the 7th Environmental Action 
Programme, Europe’s environmental policy focus 
until 2020, specifically targets sustainable urban 
cities (EU, 2011a). Urban areas have a key role in 
the implementation of the Europe 2020 priori-
ties of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
(European Commission, 2010). Urban areas form 
the basis of European initiatives, such as ESPON, 
URBACT, EUKN, RFSC and JPI Urban Europe. In the 
context of climate change, urban carbon emis-
sion reduction initiatives include the “Covenant 
of Mayors”; a commitment by local authorities 
to exceed the European CO2 reduction target of 
40% by 2030 (CMCE, 2015). The importance of 
urban areas within Europe and the diversity of 
policy challenges confronting them is leading to 
increasing intergovernmental cooperation in the 
establishment of a European Urban Agenda (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016b). 
Urban areas are dynamic with interacting factors, 
such as, (i) a changing population and demo-
graphic structure, (ii) changing cultural/societal 
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values, living standards and lifestyles, and (iii) 
policy driving their future form and function. 
Future urban areas are not without their own 
challenges, for example, they must: (i) adapt to 
demographic change as a consequence of an 
aging European population and migration, and 
(ii) deal with the social and environmental im-
plications of climate change. Indirectly, urban 
areas have an important influence on biodiver-
sity loss, society’s capacity for food generation 
and long-term resilience of ecosystem services. 
Such challenges highlight the need for project-
ing future urban expansion and reflecting on 
the implications for policy development. 
This chapter considers the structure and extent 
of future urbanisation under a set of alternative 
socio-economic scenarios. Modelling outcomes 
are primarily presented at a pan-European scale 
via the RUG (v4) model. However, regional scale 
variability is also discussed with focal studies 
based on a detailed urban model developed 
specifically for Hungary.
The pan-European scale model (RUG), disaggre-
gates artificial surfaces (associated with human 
settlements and manufacturing activities) into 
four distinct classes; (i) urban, heavily popu-
lated city centres, (ii) suburban regions, that 
is, less densely populated urban areas/conur-
bations, (iii) sparsely populated rural villages, 
hamlets and small towns, and (iv) non-residen-
tial, industrial and manufacturing areas.
Future socio-economic scenarios are based on 
the SSPs (shared socio-economic pathways) 
specifically developed for Europe (Kok and Ped-
de, 2016). SSP storylines form the basis of RUG 
parameterisation. For example, changing plan-
ning legislation and societal preferences con-
trol the distribution of the population across 
each residential type and density at which they 
reside. Such parameters will mitigate/magnify 
urban expansion (Figure 28). The location of this 
expansion is controlled by societal preferences, 
within each SSP, which describe whether society 
seeks to reside in close proximity to (i) green 
open spaces or urban areas, and (ii) landscape 
features such as the coast, waterbodies and 
protected areas (Figure 28). 
How might artificial 
surface expansion vary 
across Europe?
The extent and spatial pattern of future artificial 
surface expansion is highly dependent upon the 
socio-economic scenario considered (Figure 29); 
artificial surface extent varies from 4% (SSP1, 
SSP4) to 9% (SSP5) of the European land area by 
2100. At a European scale, SSP5 is characterised 
by urban sprawl; artificial areas expand to an 
area over twice that of SSP1/SSP4 by 2100. This 
sprawl parallels the scenario storyline in which 
a growing, individualistic and wealthy society 
seeks larger properties in suburban and rural 
areas. Urban sprawl of this magnitude will (i) 
increase the competition for land (for example, 
with food production or nature protection), and 
(ii) detrimentally impact ecosystem services and 
biodiversity. The Cities of Tomorrow report states 
that “urban sprawl and the spread of low-density 
settlements is one of the main threats to sus-
tainable territorial development” (EU, 2011b).
Although driven by different mechanisms, limited 
artificial surface increases are predicted in SSP1 
and SSP4; a reflection of the scenario storylines. 
Within SSP1 an increasingly environmentally 
aware society shifts towards more sustainable, 
higher density living; a shift that mitigates sub-
stantive artificial surface expansion. The vibrant 
and attractive urban areas of SSP1 are, however, 
in stark contrast to the urban ghettos of SSP4. 
In this scenario, urban living is a consequence 
of a poorer society migrating to urban centres in 
search of jobs and social services. 
At a sub-European scale, a clear distinction ex-
ists in the modelling outcomes of selected east-
ern countries (BG, HR, LT, LV and RO) and the rest 
of Europe; a distinction driven by demographics. 
These eastern countries are, within SSP5, char-
acterised by an aging, but overall decreasing 
population (IIASA, 2015); a distinct contrast to 
the population increases associated with SSP5 in 
the remainder of Europe. Consequently, minimal 
artificial surface expansion is projected in the 
specified eastern countries under SSP5. In this 
region, the artificial surfaces increase is most 
substantial in SSP3. While this scenario is also 
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characterised by an aging and declining popula-
tion, a slow rate of change combined with a shift 
towards suburban development (associated with 
urban in-migration and weak planning laws) re-
sults in artificial surface expansion. 
The SSPs highlight the potential extent of future 
artificial surface change under very different 
socio-economic circumstances. Important dis-
tinctions between the scenarios include (i) the 
potential to mitigate artificial surface expansion 
Figure 28. Parameterisation of the pan-European RUG model within the context of the European SSPs, from IMPRESSIONS.
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via increasing population densities (as evident 
in SSP1), (ii) the potential of artificial surfaces 
to ‘sprawl’ in the presence of increasing popu-
lations, and/or changing residential preferences 
(SSP5), (iii) the influence of changing residential 
habits which do not guarantee a static artificial 
surface footprint when populations decline (se-
lection of countries in SSP3), and (iv) regional 
variability in artificial surface expansion. 
Sustainable urban development is characterised 
by compact urban forms which promote, (i) re-
duced car reliance and travel times improving en-
ergy efficiencies and promoting public transport, 
(ii) improved social service provision, (iii) higher 
population densities and an associated reduction 
in the heating/energy costs, and (iv) circular econ-
omies typically associated with increased resource 
efficiencies. Such characteristics are most paral-
leled by the outcomes of SSP1, which promotes a 
shift towards higher density urban centres.
Figure 29. The projected change, from baseline, in artificial surface extent by 2100 under four different socio-economic 
scenarios. Darker colours are associated with greater artificial surface expansion, from IMPRESSIONS.
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What is the effect of 
land-use planning and 
residential preferences on 
future urban development 
across Europe?
Life-cycle stage has been identified as a pre-
dominant factor in defining the residential lo-
cation of an individual/household (Fontaine 
and Rounsevell, 2009; Fontaine et al., 2014). 
The inclusion of residential preferences, the 
link between population demographics and 
‘preferred’1 residential type, enables the RUG 
model to explore the construct of future urban 
areas.
Sprawling urbanisation within SSP5 (Question 
1) was attributed to an increased population 
and shift in preference towards more expansive 
residential types. This shift is clearly evident in 
the (i) projected artificial surface profile of the 
SSP5 scenario which is primarily constructed 
of suburban/town (36%) and rural (38%) ar-
eas by 2100, and (ii) rate of change projected 
for each artificial surface type; suburban/town 
and rural areas triple or double, respectively, 
in their extent in comparison to relatively stat-
ic urban centres.
European scale statistics mask underlying vari-
ability, as exemplified for the suburban resi-
dential type (Figure 30), driven by (i) regionally 
variable demographics and/or residential pref-
erences, and (ii) a strong correlation between 
new developments and the existing artificial 
surface network. Cities, and their associated 
suburbs, within Belgium, the Netherlands, west-
ern Germany and southern United Kingdom, are 
characterised by their close proximity. Future 
suburban developments are typically focused 
in these densely populated regions; highlight-
ed by the concentrated artificial surface change 
(darker colours) of Figure 30. By contrast, Den-
1 Changes to societies’ residential ‘preferences’, as de-
fined in RUG, can represent a choice driven by an at-
traction/like or a forced shift required to satisfy a need 
(for jobs, access to social services etc.).
Box 1. An example of local scale modelling 
for Hungary
Modelled urbanisation change, within Hungary, is 
based on a region specific model of urban devel-
opment and associated socio-economic scenari-
os. These scenarios while based on the European 
SSPs have been specifically co-developed for the 
region with local stakeholders.
Within Hungary, artificial areas (of all types) are 
projected to increase from 5.4% of the Hungarian 
land area in 2010 to between 6.2 and 8.4% in 2100. 
Increasing artificial areas are observed in all sce-
narios. The only exception to this trend is SSP3 
in which no urban expansion occurs between 
2070 and 2100 (a specification of the scenario 
storyline). Following the patterns observed in 
Europe, SSP5 is projected to lead to the greatest 
urban development; artificial surfaces increase 
(sprawl) by 48.3%. As the population of Hungary 
increases in SSP5, the population density (inhab-
itants per km2 residential area) of all urban areas 
is projected to increase. It is not until 2070 and 
beyond that, due to the sprawling development, 
as assumed under SSP5, that population densi-
ties start to decline within the major urban areas, 
that is, capital and the regional centres.
A characteristic of all the socio-economic sce-
narios in Hungary is a major “population flow” 
and peri-urbanisation of Budapest. Populations 
are projected to move from both (i) the city-centre 
to suburban (fringe) areas of the capital, and (ii) 
from Pest county to the capital. These projections 
suggest that future local urban policies should 
take into consideration the potential underutili-
sation of urban infrastructure within the capital 
(to minimise sprawl) and the additional pressures 
of ensuring social service provision in suburban 
(fringe) areas. Following the patterns observed in 
Europe, SSP1 is most paralleled with sustainable 
urban development as it (a) promotes compact 
development, and (b) ensures that, in spite of a 
declining national population, population densi-
ties are maintained (or only slightly decrease) in 
the capital and regional centres. 
78
mark, Sweden, Finland, France and the interior 
of Spain and Portugal are characterised by more 
sparsely distributed cities. Suburban expansion 
(Figure 30) tends therefore to be associated 
with ‘hotspots’ of change around existing cities. 
These regional differences highlight contrast-
ing sustainable development challenges. Plan-
ning in the compact cities of the Netherlands 
and Germany is focused on achieving sustain-
able urban densification while accommodating 
green space so as to be prepared for climate 
change challenges, such as flooding and heat 
stress. For cities in France and Sweden the chal-
lenge is how to balance future suburban expan-
sion while protecting green space at the subur-
ban-urban interface.
Figure 30. The projected change, from baseline, in suburban areas by 2100 under four different socio-economic scenari-
os, from IMPRESSIONS. Darker colours are associated with greater artificial surface expansion.
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Figure 31. European scale population as a function of residential type at 2100 under four socio-economic scenarios; (a) 
Population count (Millions), and (b) proportional representation, from IMPRESSIONS.
How might urban, 
suburban and rural 
populations change under 
future socio-economic 
scenarios? 
Population projections project, at a European 
scale, an overall increase in population in the 
SSP1 and SSP5 socio-economic scenarios. Con-
versely, SSP3 and SSP4 are characterised by de-
clining (and aging) populations (IIASA, 2015). 
Modelling the SSP storylines for this overall de-
mographic change, and link between life-cycle 
stage and residential preferences, allows RUG 
to explore the residential circumstances of this 
future population (Figure 31). 
At the European scale, the increasing popula-
tion projected in SSP1 predominantly resides in 
cities, which account for a higher proportion of 
the total population (44%) when compared to 
the baseline (36%), (Figure 31b). An increasingly 
city dwelling population is evident in SSP4 where 
cities become the predominant residential type, 
housing 53% of the population (Figure 31b). The 
largest change in the residential structure of the 
population, at a European scale, is observed in 
the urban sprawl of SSP5; a substantial decrease 
in the proportion of the population resident in 
cities (declining to 18%) and increasingly subur-
ban (36%) /rural (46%) population (Figure 31b). 
The RUG model assumes that existing artificial 
surfaces are maintained. Further, populations 
are assumed to reside in their preferred resi-
dential type; they are not forced to populate the 
existing artificial surface footprint. Consequently, 
it is viable for population densities, within ex-
isting urban areas, to decrease, replicating pro-
cesses of artificial surface abandonment. This is 
reflected in the declining city-based population 
of SSP5. This could lead to urban decline via the 
abandonment of buildings and associated social 
issues (crime, poor quality housing) or the de-
velopment of increased urban green space and/
or ‘gentrification’ of city areas. In a contrasting 
process, the declining population of rural areas, 
particularly within SSP3 (which falls to 15%; Fig-
ure 31), are indicative of rural abandonment. This 
abandonment is likely to be associated with in-
creased social problems within rural areas (due 
to the closure of services) and may impact the 
availability of labour in the agricultural sector. 
Historically, rural – urban migrants have encoun-
tered increased social problems (unemployment 
and/or low paid work, lack of adequate housing) 
within their new urban environments. 
Residential types are a key indicator of ac-
cess to social infrastructure such as education, 
health-care, and broadband. A shift towards 
the higher density urban areas in SSP1, and to 
some extent SSP3 and SSP4, is advantageous in 
terms of ensuring service provision and trans-
port efficiencies. Currently, approximately 68% 
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of Europe’s population have ‘ease of access’2 
to a city, this proportion increases substan-
tially to ~80% to 85% in SSP1, SSP3, and SSP4. 
However, these advantages are unlikely to be 
realised in the socio-economic circumstances 
of SSP3 and SSP4. The dense cities and urban 
ghettos of SSP4 highlight regions where social 
issues are typically prevalent (unemployment, 
poverty, segregation, exclusion, crime etc.) and 
urban regeneration policies should be target-
ed. The urban sprawl of SSP5 does not promote 
efficiencies in the provision of public services; 
a shift to suburban/rural based populations is 
indicative of distributed service provision. This 
poses key environmental challenges in regard 
to, for example, achieving emission reduction 
targets given the foreseen use of cars rather 
than low-carbon public transport.
Currently, up to one third of Europe’s city pop-
ulations are exposed to air pollution levels 
in excess of air quality standards (EEA, 2015), 
while half are exposed to excessive traffic 
noise (EEA, 2015). The SSP3 and SSP4 storylines 
describe poor urban planning, urban ghettos 
and low levels of environmental/social aware-
ness; conditions likely to magnify current city-
based pollution issues and social challenges 
such as cohesion and segregation. In these 
scenarios not only are planning and gover-
nance structures weak but, the capacity of so-
ciety to reflect on the long-term consequences 
of its choices are lacking; circumstances which, 
when combined, are likely to exacerbate cur-
rent socio–ecological problems. The cities de-
scribed in SSP1 are environmentally friendly 
and designed to promote human well-being. 
However, to achieve this societal goal in dense 
urban areas, green spaces, building and in-
frastructure design must be properly planned 
and managed to mitigate the known negative 
human health effects.
How might the vulnerability of an urban society 
vary under future socio-economic scenarios?
Socio-economic scenarios which are based on 
sustainable urban development, such as SSP1, 
2 Defined as the proportion of the population residing in 
or within the same 10’ cell as a city area.
have been demonstrated to promote slow-
er rates of artificial surface development and 
more compact urban forms. Such development 
promotes, inter alia (i) efficiencies in transport, 
social service provision and resource use, (ii) 
minimal land competition, and (iii) improved 
air, noise, water and environmental quality. Sus-
tainable development scenarios are strongly 
dependent upon an increasing (and substantial) 
shift in societal preferences to high-density, en-
vironmentally friendly city living. Social change, 
strong planning and/or regulation are required 
to achieve the targeted residential densities of 
city areas while ensuring green spaces, building 
and infrastructure design are correctly planned 
and managed to mitigate the known human 
health effects and social problems common in 
densely populated urban areas.
Contrasting SSP1 to SSP3 and SSP4, it is evident 
that an increasingly urbanised population can 
arise independently of sustainability concerns. 
These alternate scenarios lead to urban ghettos 
(SSP4) and urban sprawl commensurate with 
countryside abandonment (SSP3). The urban 
densification associated with SSP4 does min-
imise artificial surface change and associated 
land competition issues. However, the resultant 
urban ghettos are likely to be characterised by 
high levels of social problems and poor environ-
mental quality. The urban sprawl in SSP3, while 
significantly less than in SSP5, is poorly planned 
and therefore likely to impair ecosystem service 
provision. As a consequence, both scenarios 
are likely to result in an increasingly urbanised 
society, which has a lower coping capacity and 
higher vulnerability to climate change.
Sprawling artificial surface expansion from ~3% 
to ~9% of the European land area, under SSP5, 
exacerbates competition with the agriculture 
and forestry sectors, leading to an increasing-
ly urbanised population having to balance the 
ability to meet demand in terms of food and 
resource supply. Within this scenario, there is 
a projected greater than 60% increase in the 
number of people with ‘ease of access’2 to ex-
isting protected areas. Such access to green 
space is known to be beneficial from a human 
well-being perspective. However, such large 
increases in the population adjacent to natu-
ral areas is likely to put increasing pressure on 
fragile ecosystems, the services they provide 
and the biodiversity they support. Similar in-
creases are observed in the population in close 
proximity to a waterbody (59% increase) and the 
coast (83% increase) having significant implica-
tions in terms of the vulnerability of population 
to flooding, the extent of remedial engineer-
ing required to mitigate this and the potential 
impacts on these ecosystems and the services 
they provide. The patterns of artificial surface 
development observed in this scenario have 
been identified as a serious threat to Europe’s 
sustainable urban agenda (EU, 2011b).
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Climate impacts in an 
increasingly globalized world 
Lead Authors: Henrik Carlsen and Nakia Pearson
Key messages
 ᴑ Transnational climate change impacts could 
have substantial effects on Europe. High-
end scenarios could imply increased sys-
temic effects of climate change, including 
cross-sectoral and transnational climate 
impacts. However, research on the physical 
as well as governance aspects of transna-
tional climate impacts is still in its infancy.
 ᴑ Transnational climate impacts still play a 
minor role in the EU, as well as in Members 
States’ adaptation policies. The potential 
international dimension of climate impacts 
may provide incentives for more collabora-
tion between EU Member States, as well as 
between the EU and other parts of the world. 
Policy context
The international dimension of climate change 
has mostly been framed around efforts to mit-
igate emissions of greenhouse gases, while ad-
aptation planning has often taken a predom-
inantly territorial approach by only assessing 
impacts of climate change emerging within each 
country’s borders. However, in an increasingly 
globalized world, no country is fully insulated 
from the impacts of climate change outside its 
borders. Hitherto this aspect of climate change 
has only played a minor role in EU policies. 
The following table briefly describes key EU poli-
cies of relevance for addressing climate change 
beyond Europe’s borders. While the selection is 
not exhaustive, it includes the most relevant policy 
areas. One exception is the EU Adaptation Strategy 
which is briefly discussed in the final section.
Policy Competence Summary
Climate Action for 
Developing Countries
EU is largest contributor (80%) of climate science to developing countries, with a spending 
focus on mitigation. EU has pledged to the UN Green Climate Fund to finance developing 
countries’ transition to low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.
Humanitarian Aid In the 
Framework of Climate 
Disasters
EU planners have begun to assess climate factors as part of conflict management 
scenario building and to tighten coordination with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism 
in facilitating EU emergency responses. The Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme 
(DIPECHO) aims to increase resilience and preparedness of at-risk communities, and 
to reduce their vulnerability by training, establishing or improving local early warning 
systems and contingency planning. 
Trade
A lack of precise language in both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement,(CETA) deal that would 
otherwise compel investors to take environmental and other social protections 
more seriously into account, thereby ensuring better coherency between trade and 
environmental values in EU Trade Policy.
Climate Action for Europe’s 
Neighbours 
EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) supports climate change mitigation and adaptation in 
the EU’s closest eastern (Clima East) and southern (Clima South) neighbours. Financial 
and technological assistance is employed towards strengthening the capacity to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, preparation for climate change impacts, climate resilience 
and economic development and employment. The programme lacks development 
strategies within mobility partnerships (MPs) that focus on climate adaptation and 
resilience strategies. 
EU Policy Competence of Relevance for 
Transnational Climate Impacts
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Transnational climate im-
pacts 
In order to understand these transnational cli-
mate impacts (TCI) IMPRESSIONS has developed 
a conceptual framework (Benzie et al., 2016) in-
cluding four risk pathways: 
 ᴑ The biophysical pathway encompasses trans-
boundary ecosystems, such as river basins, 
oceans and the atmosphere; 
 ᴑ The finance pathway represents capital flows 
and climate impacts on assets held overseas; 
 ᴑ The people pathway involves the movement 
of people between countries, e.g. tourism 
and migration;
 ᴑ The trade pathway transmits climate risks 
across international supply chains. 
Transnational climate impacts are transmitted 
across borders along these four risk pathways, 
affecting one country – and requiring adapta-
tion there – as a result of climate change or cli-
mate-induced extreme events in another country. 
Figure 32 provides a preliminary assessment of 
Europe’s exposure to transnational climate im-
pacts compared to climate risks that emerge 
within each European country’s borders. The 
map is constructed by identifying and quanti-
fying individual indicators along the four risk 
pathways, e.g. migration from climate vulnera-
ble countries in the people pathway and cere-
al import dependency in the trade pathway, as 
well as an indicator assessing a country’s em-
beddness in the global context. 
It is evident that while Europe ranks low on the 
(global) index assessing climate risks emerg-
ing from within each country’s border, the pic-
ture with regards to transnational climate risks 
Policy Competence Summary
Climate Security
Military missions, as part of EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), mainly 
focus on disaster response and maintaining stability, rather than disaster preparedness. 
Investments are occurring in the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
system with satellites and other capabilities to collect data. Early warning enhancement 
specifically linked to climate change are not clear or easy to operationalise (Youngs, 2014).
Migration
EU external migration policy in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) 
officially recognises climate-induced migration, but “the voluntary and selective nature 
of its implementation” significantly erodes its ability to promote climate adaptation 
within mobility dialogues (Blocher, 2016). Within Europe, few countries’ legislation 
explicitly protects environmentally displaced people (Kräler et al., 2011). The EU Lisbon 
treaty does not address disasters in non-member states, neither does it treat instances 
of the cross-border movement of EU citizens within Europe in the context of disasters 
(Kälin and Schrepfer, 2012).
Figure 32. Comparing climate risks for European countries using two different indices: ND-GAIN and the TCI index , from 
IMPRESSIONS. The left map shows climate risks emerging from within a country’s borders while the right figure showS 
exposure to transnational climate risks. 
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is much more mixed. One example of a country 
scoring low on both indices is Poland. Several 
European countries score high on transnational 
climate risks, but for different reasons. Portugal’s 
high score is mainly due to high reliance on trans-
boundary water (biophysical pathway). Likewise, 
the Netherlands, along with Belgium and Germa-
ny, show high reliance on transboundary water. 
All Scandinavian countries, Germany and the 
Benelux countries are ranked high in the peo-
ple pathway (due to openness to asylum seekers 
and migrants) and the trade pathway. 
Figure 33 compares EU Member States with oth-
er countries with regards to risks from within 
each country’s border (horizontal axis) and TCI 
(vertical axis). The figure shows that EU Mem-
ber States are relatively less vulnerable to ter-
ritorial climate risks (they are all to the left in 
the figure). However, EU Member States span a 
relatively large part of the vertical dimension. 
In fact, there are only a few countries globally 
that score higher on the TCI index than those 
EU Member States that are most exposed to TCI 
(Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium). 
Climate risks that emerge within a country’s 
borders is only half the story, countries are also 
affected by impacts beyond its borders. Hith-
erto, almost all adaptation planning in Europe 
fails to incorporate these transnational climate 
impacts. Furthermore, although climate change 
is integrated into the EU’s broader development 
cooperation portfolio, transnational climate im-
pacts are generally not accounted for in nation-
al adaptation planning in partner countries. 
Transnational Climate 
Impacts – Insights from a 
Case Study on Cross-bor-
der Climate-Induced Mi-
gration
Cross-border migration from Bangladesh to In-
dia is an example of South-South movements 
with a complex array of drivers and outcomes 
that nuance assumptions about direct causal 
links between climate change and migration. 
While much of this migration 
has been associated with the 
1971 Bangladeshi Liberation 
War and subsequent attacks 
against Hindu religious mi-
norities (Kumar, 2009), sever-
al studies project that climate 
change will lead to increased 
flows of migrants from Bangla-
desh to India (Homer-Dixon, 
1994; Myers, 2002; Alam, 2003). 
Water scarcity in some areas 
has been linked to cross-bor-
der movements, while sudden 
disasters have been associated 
with higher migration flows to 
India in the hope of securing 
some additional resources to 
cope with the disaster (Pan-
el Discussion on Management 
of Water Resources and Wa-
ter Security: The Case of the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, 
2010 cited by McAdams et al., 
2010; Poncelet, 2010). 
Figure 33. Comparing EU member states (blue circles) with non-member 
countries (red circles) with regards to climate risks emerging from within 
each country’s borders (as measured by the ND-GAIN index; horizontal axis) 
and transnational climate impacts (as measured by the TCI index; vertical 
axis). Nine EU Member States are highlighted as well as a selection of key 
countries (China, Russia, US) and most territorially vulnerable countries 
(Togo, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, DR Congo). 
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Drawing on fieldwork which took place in Octo-
ber 2016 in communities situated in cyclone-af-
fected areas in Southwest Bangladesh and West 
Bengal, this HELIX case study examines the na-
ture of cross-border migration from climate-vul-
nerable areas in Bangladesh into India, and 
to what extent it may offer some insight into 
transnational climate impacts in Europe.
The study reveals a plethora of drivers that re-
flect Bangladesh’s complicated relationship 
with religion and identifies politics, lack of job 
availability, the development gap between the 
two neighbouring countries, insufficient adapta-
tion mechanisms, as well as cross-border family 
networks. The way that these drivers interact is 
complicated. For instance, while climate hazards 
are not always the first reason people give for 
migrating, they are often referred to as the main 
reasons for livelihood uncertainty, which drives 
family members to migrate over the short- and 
long-term from affected areas in order to re-
store income losses or to improve their access 
to diverse livelihood options and better living 
standards. Furthermore, lack of trust in the gov-
ernment due to inadequate early warning sig-
nals and unequal distribution of post-disaster 
assistance, often mingle with pre-existing po-
litico-religious tensions, which only exacerbate 
feelings of insecurity, and thus fuels the urge to 
leave the country permanently. 
The study also yielded several counterintuitive 
results. While cross-border migration is often 
deemed unlikely for the poor, particularly when 
resources are strained in the aftermath of a di-
saster (Henry et al., 2004; Findley, 1994), migra-
tion can be facilitated by transnational familial 
and social networks (McAdam and Saul, 2010). 
Furthermore, few participants who had already 
made the move to India had any intention to 
migrate again further into India, preferring to re-
main in the West Bengal area where there were 
no language barriers, and where their social net-
works could ensure their integration. This contra-
dicts common assumptions that environmental 
migration eventually leads to intercontinental 
migration in Europe (Population Council, 2011). 
Furthermore, many households refused to mi-
grate despite having suffered major losses after 
repeated catastrophes. Often, climate hazards 
had become built into their worldview, and re-
constructing their houses built into their lifestyle. 
Policy implications 
The extension of the impacts and adaptation 
agenda to also include transnational climate 
impacts has policy implications for the EU and 
its Member States with regard to transmissions 
of climate risks between Member States as well 
as with regard to impacts outside the Union 
that are transmitted to the EU. 
Adaptation in the EU: The EU plays an important 
role in coordinating adaptation strategies and 
enhancing solidarity when climate impacts tran-
scend individual state borders, to ensure that 
the most vulnerable regions are able to adapt. 
This is not adequately addressed in the EU’s key 
policy instrument for climate adaptation, the EU 
Adaptation Strategy (DG CLIMA), which ensures 
funding for cross-border coastal and flood man-
agement. This strategy is currently undergoing 
an evaluation which should take into account 
the Paris Agreement and “the direct and indirect 
effects of climate change outside the European 
Union”. This evaluation should include the lat-
est science with regard to analysis and assess 
transnational climate impacts which are direct-
ly relevant to EU, national and corporate adap-
tation frameworks, and should be incorporated 
into their strategies and plans. The European 
Environment Agency’s recent report on impacts 
and vulnerability in Europe (EEA, 2016) has a sec-
tion devoted to ‘Europe’s vulnerability to climate 
change impacts outside Europe’. This report 
could provide valuable input to the evaluation of 
the Adaptation Strategy. 
International development and cooperation: 
The European Union is the largest international 
aid donor, collectively (the Commission (DG DEV-
CO) and its Member States) providing more than 
half of global official development assistance, 
and the EU is also the world’s largest contributor 
of climate finance to developing countries. In its 
efforts to integrate climate action into partner 
countries’ development planning, the EU should 
explicitly design programmes and finance mech-
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anisms to address transnational climate im-
pacts, including via multi-country projects. By 
framing climate risks as a common risk between 
countries the EU could play a facilitating role to 
enhance international cooperation. 
Trade: Being the world’s largest importer and 
exporter trade is vital for economic growth in the 
EU, and the EU is, therefore, active in strength-
ening the multilateral trading system, as exem-
plified by its active role in WTO, the new trade 
agreement with Canada (CETA) and ongoing ne-
gotiations on TTIP. However, coherency between 
the social and environmental values of the EU 
trade policy have not been met in the latter two 
trade deals, and sustainable development must 
therefore be better defined in the agreements 
if such deals are not to undermine the environ-
mental integrity of signatory countries. 
Foreign Policy: Climate change is addressed as 
one key risk in the EU Global Strategy. The strat-
egy recognises the potential for climate change 
and environmental degradation to exacerbate 
potential conflict, as well as to be an important 
driver of migration across Europe’s borders. A key 
focus of the Common Security and Defence Pol-
icy (CDSP) has been on deploying military mis-
sions to climate-stressed regions of the world, 
thereby demonstrating an approach aimed at 
disaster response rather than on preparedness. 
Capacity for impact-based early warning sys-
tems for climate risks must be developed, while 
more comprehensive partnerships are sought 
between the various EU organisations and poli-
cies such as CSDP, ENP, DG CLIMA and DG DEVCO 
in order to implement climate action that ho-
listically increases preparedness and improves 
resilience in developing countries. 
Migration: The South Asia case study demon-
strates the need for more policy collaboration 
between countries in the event of cross-border 
climate displacement. Concrete strategies and 
dedicated funding, along with more systematic 
inclusion of modules on climate change should 
be included in migration profiles and mobility 
dialogues in the GAMM (Blocher, 2016). Equal-
ly, adaptation and migration can be discussed 
within the scope of mobility partnerships of the 
ENP Clima East and Clima South MPs. Any such 
discussion should situate climate change migra-
tion within a constellation of drivers, risks, vul-
nerabilities, opportunities and corresponding 
coping strategies that all affect the choices of 
climate-stressed people. The EU Global Strate-
gy 2016, which puts emphasis on preventing the 
root causes of displacement, can be funnelled 
into various adaptation and development proj-
ects to improve the resilience of environmen-
tally vulnerable countries. In showcasing coun-
terintuitive examples of the way people move, 
the Bangladeshi case study challenges common 
causal assumptions that have thus far guided 
policy on border securitisation. This demands 
more careful policy analysis which acknowledg-
es the less direct trajectories of climate-induced 
migration, thereby more accurately responding 
to practices on the ground. 
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 ᴑ Either avoiding or exceeding 2oC global warm-
ing could pose unprecedented challenges as 
well as new opportunities for societal trans-
formation. Innovative approaches in science 
and policy may be required. Integrated strat-
egies for these new social-ecological condi-
tions could be achieved, and ensured in the 
long run, by linking climate-oriented, practi-
cal, systemic solutions to sustainable devel-
opment. 
 ᴑ Sustainable solutions are those that are able 
to overcome multiple trade-offs between 
ecological integrity and socio-econom-
ic goals in ways which can be turned into 
positive synergies. Clusters of sustainable 
solutions can be identified, tested and im-
plemented by integrating multiple forms of 
knowledge and values in concrete places fol-
lowing transformative visions of the kind of 
world in which we want to live. 
 ᴑ Conventional and additive approaches fo-
cusing on single sectors, scales or either ad-
aptation or mitigation without considering 
long-term sustainable development may not 
be enough to cope with the mounting risks 
and challenges of high-end climate change. 
Innovative approaches entail combining 
multiple systems of solutions that not only 
solve present problems but also learn how to 
transform current systems arrangements so 
as to prevent them occurring again.
 ᴑ Conventional policy appraisal methods are 
designed for relatively short-term, well-un-
derstood policy choices in single sectors and 
are not feasible for transformative approach-
es combining multiple systems of solutions.
They face severe limitations for assessing 
the impact of very long-term decisions about 
adaption and mitigation in the face of large 
climate risks. 
Key scientific findings
Cross-sectoral implications of high-end 
climate change
Earlier sections of this report provide evidence of 
the strong interconnectedness of social-environ-
mental systems and the ways that these inter-
linkages can exacerbate the potential negative 
impacts of HECC. However, such interconnected-
ness also creates new opportunities for the im-
plementation of innovative systems of solutions. 
For example, some clusters of systems especially 
relevant in the context of HECC are the following: 
Trade – Food - Agriculture systems cluster: In 
the case of European agriculture, model results 
suggest that trading patterns and the willingness 
of land managers to adopt novel land-uses are 
extremely important in allowing adaptation to 
changing climatic or socio-economic conditions. 
This means that non-climatic factors, including 
consumer behaviour, will substantially deter-
mine both food supply levels and the scope for 
maintaining other necessary or desired land-us-
es in Europe under HECC. Furthermore, the 
spatial distribution of impacts on arable and 
livestock systems will depend on the relative im-
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pacts of future change on agricultural and for-
est profitability and the availability of irrigation 
water. Supporting change in consumer patterns, 
e.g. towards organic, less meat or more locally 
produced products, can also support new job 
creation, reduce GHG emissions and transform 
agriculture in ways that reduces harmful effects 
on biophysical systems. 
Water - Land-use – Biodiversity Conservation 
cluster: There is significant potential for integrat-
ed solutions to address the cross-sectoral inter-
actions between hydrological systems, land-use 
planning and biodiversity conservation. HECC will 
have impacts on water availability and quality in 
many catchments. The projected increase in se-
verity and duration of droughts, especially for the 
southern part of Europe, will have implications 
for various sectors, including agriculture, forest 
and ecosystems, domestic supply, power supply 
and tourism. The scope for successful biodiver-
sity and ecosystem conservation under HECC de-
pends upon the interplay of climate and human 
land-use. Even if conservation is prioritised, the 
need for basic resources such as food, water, en-
ergy and timber means that natural areas may 
suffer loss of extent and coherence regardless 
of any direct climate impacts. Cross-sectoral in-
teractions can arise through poorly implement-
ed land-use changes. Similarly, any change in 
protected areas may have significant land-use 
implications. Coping with growing water stress 
and loss of biodiversity resulting from HECC will 
involve implementation of integrated river basin 
and ecosystem conservation strategies to find 
and harmonise positive synergies between land-
use and nature-based solutions policies. 
Urban – Health - Mobility systems cluster: Most 
people in Europe live in cities and to a large ex-
tent the health of European citizens depends on 
the quality of their urban environments. HECC 
could increase the severity and duration of heat 
waves, trigger longer periods of thermal inver-
sion in cities leading to worsening air quality and 
posing new challenges to fossil fuel-based urban 
mobility. However, urban centres are also where 
most innovations related to transformative eco-
nomic arrangements and smart technologies in 
the use of energy and resources are taking place. 
New work-place arrangements reducing unnec-
essary travel and making new forms of a shar-
ing economy possible could further foster such 
innovations and lead to multiple co-benefits 
in improved health, green wealth creation and 
more climate-resilient styles of urban living. 
Cross-scale implications of high-end cli-
mate change
Findings in this report show systems’ linkages 
across spatial and temporal scales. For example, 
with reference to spatial scale and biodiversity 
protection, it is shown that for some scenarios, 
protecting areas to prevent intensification and 
preserve habitats in one location may lead to 
knock-on effects on other habitats elsewhere. 
The spatial linkages are also shown via indirect 
effects of climate change: in an increasingly glo-
balized world, no country is fully insulated from 
the impacts of climate change outside its bor-
ders. To date, almost all adaptation planning in 
Europe fails to incorporate these transnational 
climate impacts. Transnational climate interlink-
ages also need to be addressed in internation-
al development policies and can trigger novel 
forms of global cooperation. 
Temporal scale interlinkages are addressed in 
the example of coastal adaptation and ecosys-
tems restoration, where decisions have a long 
life-time, long-term impact and are often costly. 
Exploring adaptation pathways and integrating 
them into resilient mitigation policies can help 
decision makers to take the right decisions at 
the right time without path-dependency. In the 
face of uncertainty, managers and planners are 
urged to develop robust adaptive plans capable 
of anticipating and preventing multiple negative 
irreversible consequences. Such plans consist 
of combinations of both short-term actions and 
long-term options. These plans should be suc-
cessful for a range of possible futures and flexi-
ble enough to adapt to changing conditions and 
“expected surprises”.
The limits of adaptation and mitigation un-
der high-end scenarios
Beyond the 2oC global warming threshold, con-
ventional solutions to adaptation and mitigation 
may well prove not to be enough. Transforma-
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tive solutions aimed at implementing radically 
different institutional arrangements, searching 
for synergies between adaptation and mitiga-
tion and linking them to sustainable develop-
ment become increasingly central. In this regard, 
transformation has been defined as ‘the altering 
of the fundamental attributes of a system (in-
cluding value systems; regulatory, legislative, or 
bureaucratic regimes; financial institutions; and 
technological or biological systems)’ (IPCC, 2012). 
Since such transformation will likely face institu-
tional challenges, innovative solutions to HECC 
must actively contribute to the transformability 
of the overall system. Transformative solutions 
should potentially allow for a new system to 
emerge when the existing system is no longer 
feasible. Figure 34 shows the conventional ap-
proaches to climate change mitigation and ad-
aptation compared to the approaches of trans-
formative mitigation and adaptation, which are 
closer to a sustainable development approach, 
and transformation, in which transformative mit-
igation and adaptation are integrated within a 
sustainable development paradigm.
 
Conventional economic appraisal methods, such 
as cost-benefit analysis, face severe limitations 
in the context of high-end scenarios and trans-
formative solutions (Tinch et al., 2015). These 
methods depend on the ability to estimate fu-
ture market and non-market values, requiring 
monetary expressions of all costs and benefits. 
Estimates are grounded in the assumption that 
expressions of preferences, made under present 
incomes, technologies, social structures and be-
havioural options, are stable and reliable indica-
tors of welfare. This is not the case for long-term 
projections and transformative solutions that 
differ significantly from the current situation, 
due to non-linearity and threshold effects, fun-
damental data gaps and imperfect knowledge 
of ecological and social-economic relationships. 
Standard methods of assessing uncertainty, 
based on the theory of rational choice under un-
certainty and the calculation of expected values, 
cannot be employed for extreme, long-term sce-
narios for which the probability distributions of 
future events are unknown and unstable.
 
Integrated solutions to high-end climate 
change 
Single-issue, sectoral, target-based or incremen-
tal solutions alone are unlikely to deliver the 
kinds of large-scale profound transformations 
needed to ensure quality of life in the long run 
and cope with the kinds of challenges posed by 
HECC. Sustainable solutions are those that are 
able to overcome multiple trade-offs between 
ecological integrity and socio-economic goals 
in ways that can be turned into positive syner-
gies. The most innovative and robust solutions 
to HECC are those which contribute to the build-
ing the appropriate system conditions and agent 
capacities for charting alternative development 
pathways aligned with sustainability. 
Solutions must not only solve present problems 
but also help transforming current systems ar-
rangements so as to prevent them occurring in 
the future. Furthermore, innovative solutions 
need to be able to identify and explore the gov-
erning principles and mechanisms driving sys-
tems dynamics. Many of these principles and 
mechanisms have a normative and regulato-
ry content and thus lie within the domain of 
public policy. Therefore, integrating systems of 
solutions requires making explicit the kinds of 
policy principles and normative criteria which 
are to be used to guide and manage complex 
social-ecological systems. Some of these prin-
ciples are already well known, such as the pol-
luter-pays-principle, albeit barely applied fully. 
A ‘moral compass’, that helps to the redistribute 
global rights and responsibilities in the face of 
HECC and engage citizens under broad principles 
Figure 34. Conventional versus Transformative Climate Sci-
ence and Policy Approaches, from IMPRESSIONS.
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of justice, precaution and intergenerational eq-
uity, amongst others, is needed. 
Another important element in understanding 
the transformative potential for solutions is how 
they affect the future dynamics of the system 
through feedback loops. Humans not only in-
fluence, they are influenced by fluctuations in 
ecological systems, which in turn have multi-
ple reactions and often unexpected effects on 
the organisation of human societies. There are 
many feedback loops between different levels 
and domains of society, as well as in the various 
parts of ecosystems that are not fully under-
stood. Institutions ignoring these may not be 
able to engage in the necessary adaptive and 
learning behaviours and actions to prevent the 
further degradation of ecosystems. 
Synergies can occur between various respons-
es to climate change. They can occur between 
adaptation actions in the same sector (e.g. ur-
ban trees can reduce runoff and urban heat 
island effects) or in a different sector (Ber-
ry et al., 2015). They can also occur between 
adaptation and mitigation. Obviously, at the 
global scale, mitigation reduces the amount 
of adaptation that is required. It also reduces 
the speed of warming and therefore facilitates 
natural adaptation by ecosystems. Conversely, 
there are adaptation measures that also could 
provide mitigation benefits. For example, ex-
pansion of forests and overall ecosystems res-
toration can increase carbon storage, as can 
wetland/coastal habitat creation providing 
they are managed to avoid potential increases 
greenhouse gas emissions.
Alongside the need for integrated solutions, 
there is a need for innovative methods to eval-
uate adaptation and mitigation policies un-
der scenarios of high climate sensitivity (Tinch 
et al., 2015). For long-term, uncertain impacts, 
presenting policy appraisal in simple expect-
ed value terms risks giving a spurious and ul-
timately unhelpful, even dangerous, illusion of 
confidence or certainty. Approaches focusing 
on robustness and associated indicators of ca-
pacities for action are more appropriate and 
informative. There are many candidate indica-
tors relating to broad definitions of wealth and 
welfare, capabilities and capacities, and specif-
ic outcomes such as mortality or vulnerability 
indicators. Options for using these indicators 
include maximin criteria, setting vulnerability 
thresholds, or linking policy appraisal closely 
to the modelling of the evolution of capacities 
over time. Especially in the context of high-
ly unpredictable and potentially severe future 
damages, there is less interest in ‘optimal’ pol-
icy and more interest in aiding a process of re-
flection about the possible consequences of 
climate change and possible robust adaptation 
options for dealing with them, maintaining flex-
ibility, building up capacities for action at mul-
tiple scales, and encouraging the emergence of 
transformative solutions.
Examples of innovative 
integrated solutions
As indicated above, there is a need to combine 
mitigation with adaptation and sustainable de-
velopment. Solutions to HECC include any inte-
grated combination of policy measures, techno-
logical innovations, economic and information 
instruments, as well as other different types of 
conscious actions, either at the individual or 
collective level, which successfully addresses 
both the problems of climate change and un-
sustainability in concrete contexts of action. 
Thus, solutions are always situated solutions, 
taken on by specific agents in particular places 
in a dynamic learning mode. 
Climate change, with its plethora of multiple 
feedbacks and global reach, entails looking at 
many different kinds of solutions. The kinds 
of transformation needed as a result of HECC 
may not be achieved by any single kind of solu-
tion. Instead, to reach a tipping point in posi-
tive transformation to tackle HECC what may be 
required is to package and unleash the cumu-
lative, multiplicative and synergetic effects of 
different kinds of solutions. 
Solutions in the context of HECC require an 
enormous level of cooperation and social inno-
vation. To overcome trade-offs between present 
and future interests, between individual and 
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Different kinds of solutions
As a general tenet, the development of sys-
temic solutions for HECC entails moving the 
traditional science and policy focus of at-
tention from the question about ‘what is the 
problem’ towards ‘who is the solution’. Inno-
vative strategies will require the integration 
of multiple kinds of strategies:
Economic and financial measures 
Innovative forms of investment and finance 
are crucial in mobilising the resources nec-
essary for mitigation, adaptation and sus-
tainable development. Carbon pricing and 
the recycling of revenues derived from the 
Emission Trade System are major potential 
sources for such investments, but direct pri-
vate investments and small loans could also 
play a decisive role. Mobilising and linking 
large global investments funds to long-term 
sustainable climate strategies is one of the 
main and most urgent challenges to be ad-
dressed. Applying the Polluter Pays Princi-
ple in full could have tremendous positive 
effects in transforming key sectors, such as 
energy, trade, health, mobility or food pro-
duction, although rebound effects and mul-
tiple trade-offs must also be considered. 
Policy and regulatory measures
In the context of HECC, policy measures are 
needed to provide the legal enabling envi-
ronment to support transformations in a 
way that adaptation and mitigation can be 
linked sustainable development. Policy and 
regulatory measures are crucial because un-
sustainability is to a large extent an institu-
tional challenge and institutions need laws 
to secure changes in the long term. Defin-
ing the most suitable legal context to con-
front HECC cannot, however, be left to any 
single level of governance, but demands an 
interplay of many actors working at national, 
subnational and international levels using a 
long-term vision of positive change.
Organisational and corporate strategies 
Organisational strategies and solutions relate 
to the design and implementation of systems 
to meet concrete objectives, either with pri-
vate or public purposes. Organisational ca-
pacities are potentially the most important 
capacities to cope with HECC. The emergence 
of the networked society has created new op-
portunities to organise time, work and leisure 
in ways that allow improvement of quality of 
life and reduced resource use. Numerous ex-
amples of innovative ways to organise pro-
duction, consumption and distribution of 
goods and services also make it possible to 
create value and alleviate poverty in a sus-
tainable low-carbon way, by using new forms 
of finance, micro-credits, sharing and collab-
orative economy or even time-banks. 
Technologies
Green infrastructure leads to a more efficient 
and productive use of resources. It minimiz-
es environmental impacts while maximizing 
benefits to society and the economy. Green 
buildings are not just more energy efficient; 
they are also comfortable, healthier, and 
sustainable. Green building certification sys-
tems and other initiatives can encourage 
efficient use of resources while making a 
significant impact on mitigating greenhouse 
gases. An important recent development is 
‘nature-based’ solutions (e.g. green roofs, 
new forms of retaining water or dealing with 
coastal erosion). Large-scale geo-engineer-
ing to address HECC should be considered 
with caution, because if the ultimate caus-
es of unsustainability remain untouched, 
geoengineering could become more part of 
problem than of the solutions.
Behavioural, education and cultural strate-
gies  
Human and institutional behaviour are 
central to the successful implementation 
of policy. Cultural changes lie at the root 
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collective concerns, and between ecological in-
tegrity and human welfare, new forms of net-
worked leadership and transformative capaci-
ties are needed. Transformative strategies and 
solutions to HECC demand profound changes in 
institutions, in the redistribution of rights and 
responsibilities in the use of the global com-
mons, in worldviews and information systems 
as well as in the very fundamental modes of 
the economy. Innovative solutions to HECC thus 
entail fundamental modifications in social-eco-
logical interactions, which can only emerge as 
a process of social learning (Tabara et al., 2017). 
Experimentation, openness, reflection, and 
strong collaboration are central tenets for the 
emergence of such new forms of science-poli-
cy-citizens interactions. 
At this stage it would be naïve, if not incredi-
bly pretentious, to believe that we already know 
the most suitable, effective and fair solutions 
or strategies to cope with HECC. However, in-
novative solutions are already being combined 
and implemented by front-runners all over the 
world in a synergetic mode – as win-win solu-
tions, no-regrets options, or integrated plan-
ning interventions. These can be carefully scru-
tinised and communicated to help understand 
their feasibility and scalability in other contexts. 
In addition, new tools and methods being ex-
plored, for example, in the IMPRESSIONS project 
(Tabara et al., 2017), may support building ca-
pacities for action and also help to identify the 
kinds of actors required to deal with HECC and 
sustainable development. 
of systemic changes and entail changes 
in perception, aesthetics and preferences. 
Examples of behavioural changes include 
new lifestyles, vegetarianism, reducing 
individual carbon and energy footprints, 
and reducing waste. With new sustainabil-
ity values, individuals tend to support so-
cial arrangements that take into account 
the rights of future generations, respect 
and integrate the value of the non-human 
world and preserve the quality and integ-
rity of the global commons. However, while 
changing individual behaviours and prefer-
ences lies at the root of any transformative 
change at the macro level, it is not clear 
that the effects of any particular individual 
change in behaviour will have the expected 
results. The aggregate effects of individual 
action are very complex and poorly under-
stood phenomena.
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Despite the Paris Agreement, global greenhouse gas emissions remain on track 
to warm the climate by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.  Adaptation 
to such “high-end” climate change, and decisions on action to avoid it, require 
robust assessments of the associated risks.  In a complex, interdependent world, 
these  need to go beyond assessing individual impacts of gradual change.  Risk 
assessments and adaptation planning must consider interactions between various 
impacts, the potential for passing tipping points, and the need to cope with radical 
rather than gradual change.  It is vital that decision-makers have access to reliable 
scientific information on these uncertain, but potentially high-risk, scenarios of 
the future, so that they can develop and implement effective adaptation and 
mitigation plans and policies.
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